#include "system.h"
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-#include "avl_tree.h"
+#include "splay_tree.h"
#include "conf.h"
#include "connection.h"
+#include "control.h"
+#include "control_common.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "crypto.h"
+#include "digest.h"
#include "edge.h"
#include "graph.h"
#include "logger.h"
#include "net.h"
#include "netutl.h"
#include "node.h"
+#include "prf.h"
#include "protocol.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
#include "utils.h"
#include "xalloc.h"
bool send_id(connection_t *c) {
- return send_request(c, "%d %s %d", ID, myself->connection->name,
- myself->connection->protocol_version);
+ gettimeofday(&c->start, NULL);
+
+ int minor = 0;
+
+ if(experimental) {
+ if(c->config_tree && !read_ecdsa_public_key(c))
+ minor = 1;
+ else
+ minor = myself->connection->protocol_minor;
+ }
+
+ return send_request(c, "%d %s %d.%d", ID, myself->connection->name, myself->connection->protocol_major, minor);
}
-bool id_h(connection_t *c) {
+bool id_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
char name[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
- if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d", name, &c->protocol_version) != 2) {
+ if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d.%d", name, &c->protocol_major, &c->protocol_minor) < 2) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "ID", c->name,
c->hostname);
return false;
}
+ /* Check if this is a control connection */
+
+ if(name[0] == '^' && !strcmp(name + 1, controlcookie)) {
+ c->status.control = true;
+ c->allow_request = CONTROL;
+ c->last_ping_time = time(NULL) + 3600;
+ return send_request(c, "%d %d %d", ACK, TINC_CTL_VERSION_CURRENT, getpid());
+ }
+
/* Check if identity is a valid name */
if(!check_id(name)) {
/* Check if version matches */
- if(c->protocol_version != myself->connection->protocol_version) {
- logger(LOG_ERR, "Peer %s (%s) uses incompatible version %d",
- c->name, c->hostname, c->protocol_version);
+ if(c->protocol_major != myself->connection->protocol_major) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Peer %s (%s) uses incompatible version %d.%d",
+ c->name, c->hostname, c->protocol_major, c->protocol_minor);
return false;
}
return send_ack(c);
}
+ if(!experimental)
+ c->protocol_minor = 0;
+
if(!c->config_tree) {
init_configuration(&c->config_tree);
c->name);
return false;
}
- }
- if(!read_rsa_public_key(c)) {
- return false;
+ if(experimental && c->protocol_minor >= 2)
+ if(!read_ecdsa_public_key(c))
+ return false;
+ } else {
+ if(c->protocol_minor && !ecdsa_active(&c->ecdsa))
+ c->protocol_minor = 1;
}
c->allow_request = METAKEY;
- return send_metakey(c);
+ if(c->protocol_minor >= 2)
+ return send_metakey_ec(c);
+ else
+ return send_metakey(c);
}
-bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
- char *buffer;
- int len;
- bool x;
+bool send_metakey_ec(connection_t *c) {
+ logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Sending ECDH metakey to %s", c->name);
+
+ size_t siglen = ecdsa_size(&myself->connection->ecdsa);
+
+ char key[(ECDH_SIZE + siglen) * 2 + 1];
- len = RSA_size(c->rsa_key);
+ // TODO: include nonce? Use relevant parts of SSH or TLS protocol
- /* Allocate buffers for the meta key */
+ if(!ecdh_generate_public(&c->ecdh, key))
+ return false;
+
+ if(!ecdsa_sign(&myself->connection->ecdsa, key, ECDH_SIZE, key + ECDH_SIZE))
+ return false;
- buffer = alloca(2 * len + 1);
+ b64encode(key, key, ECDH_SIZE + siglen);
- c->outkey = xrealloc(c->outkey, len);
+ return send_request(c, "%d %s", METAKEY, key);
+}
- if(!c->outctx)
- c->outctx = xmalloc_and_zero(sizeof(*c->outctx));
+bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
+ if(!read_rsa_public_key(c))
+ return false;
- /* Copy random data to the buffer */
+ if(!cipher_open_blowfish_ofb(&c->outcipher))
+ return false;
+
+ if(!digest_open_sha1(&c->outdigest, -1))
+ return false;
+
+ size_t len = rsa_size(&c->rsa);
+ char key[len];
+ char enckey[len];
+ char hexkey[2 * len + 1];
- RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)c->outkey, len);
+ /* Create a random key */
+
+ randomize(key, len);
/* The message we send must be smaller than the modulus of the RSA key.
By definition, for a key of k bits, the following formula holds:
This can be done by setting the most significant bit to zero.
*/
- c->outkey[0] &= 0x7F;
+ key[0] &= 0x7F;
+
+ cipher_set_key_from_rsa(&c->outcipher, key, len, true);
ifdebug(SCARY_THINGS) {
- bin2hex(c->outkey, buffer, len);
- buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
- logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Generated random meta key (unencrypted): %s",
- buffer);
+ bin2hex(key, hexkey, len);
+ logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Generated random meta key (unencrypted): %s", hexkey);
}
/* Encrypt the random data
with a length equal to that of the modulus of the RSA key.
*/
- if(RSA_public_encrypt(len, (unsigned char *)c->outkey, (unsigned char *)buffer, c->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) {
- logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)",
- c->name, c->hostname);
+ if(!rsa_public_encrypt(&c->rsa, key, len, enckey)) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
return false;
}
/* Convert the encrypted random data to a hexadecimal formatted string */
- bin2hex(buffer, buffer, len);
- buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
+ bin2hex(enckey, hexkey, len);
/* Send the meta key */
- x = send_request(c, "%d %d %d %d %d %s", METAKEY,
- c->outcipher ? c->outcipher->nid : 0,
- c->outdigest ? c->outdigest->type : 0, c->outmaclength,
- c->outcompression, buffer);
+ bool result = send_request(c, "%d %d %d %d %d %s", METAKEY,
+ cipher_get_nid(&c->outcipher),
+ digest_get_nid(&c->outdigest), c->outmaclength,
+ c->outcompression, hexkey);
+
+ c->status.encryptout = true;
+ return result;
+}
- /* Further outgoing requests are encrypted with the key we just generated */
+static bool metakey_ec_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
+ size_t siglen = ecdsa_size(&c->ecdsa);
+ char key[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
+ char sig[siglen];
- if(c->outcipher) {
- if(!EVP_EncryptInit(c->outctx, c->outcipher,
- (unsigned char *)c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len,
- (unsigned char *)c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len -
- c->outcipher->iv_len)) {
- logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during initialisation of cipher for %s (%s): %s",
- c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
- return false;
- }
+ logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Got ECDH metakey from %s", c->name);
- c->status.encryptout = true;
+ if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, key) != 1) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "METAKEY", c->name, c->hostname);
+ return false;
}
- return x;
-}
+ int inlen = b64decode(key, key, sizeof key);
-bool metakey_h(connection_t *c) {
- char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
- int cipher, digest, maclength, compression;
- int len;
+ if(inlen != (ECDH_SIZE + siglen)) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong keylength");
+ return false;
+ }
- if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d %d %d %d %d " MAX_STRING, &cipher, &digest, &maclength, &compression, buffer) != 5) {
- logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "METAKEY", c->name,
- c->hostname);
+ if(!ecdsa_verify(&c->ecdsa, key, ECDH_SIZE, key + ECDH_SIZE)) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "invalid ECDSA signature");
return false;
}
- len = RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key);
+ char shared[ECDH_SHARED_SIZE];
- /* Check if the length of the meta key is all right */
+ if(!ecdh_compute_shared(&c->ecdh, key, shared))
+ return false;
- if(strlen(buffer) != len * 2) {
- logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong keylength");
+ /* Update our crypto end */
+
+ if(!cipher_open_by_name(&c->incipher, "aes-256-ofb"))
+ return false;
+ if(!digest_open_by_name(&c->indigest, "sha512", -1))
return false;
+ if(!cipher_open_by_name(&c->outcipher, "aes-256-ofb"))
+ return false;
+ if(!digest_open_by_name(&c->outdigest, "sha512", -1))
+ return false;
+
+ size_t mykeylen = cipher_keylength(&c->incipher);
+ size_t hiskeylen = cipher_keylength(&c->outcipher);
+
+ char *mykey;
+ char *hiskey;
+ char *seed;
+
+ if(strcmp(myself->name, c->name) < 0) {
+ mykey = key;
+ hiskey = key + mykeylen * 2;
+ xasprintf(&seed, "tinc TCP key expansion %s %s", myself->name, c->name);
+ } else {
+ mykey = key + hiskeylen * 2;
+ hiskey = key;
+ xasprintf(&seed, "tinc TCP key expansion %s %s", c->name, myself->name);
}
- /* Allocate buffers for the meta key */
+ if(!prf(shared, ECDH_SHARED_SIZE, seed, strlen(seed), key, hiskeylen * 2 + mykeylen * 2))
+ return false;
- c->inkey = xrealloc(c->inkey, len);
+ free(seed);
- if(!c->inctx)
- c->inctx = xmalloc_and_zero(sizeof(*c->inctx));
+ cipher_set_key(&c->incipher, mykey, false);
+ digest_set_key(&c->indigest, mykey + mykeylen, mykeylen);
- /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
+ cipher_set_key(&c->outcipher, hiskey, true);
+ digest_set_key(&c->outdigest, hiskey + hiskeylen, hiskeylen);
- hex2bin(buffer, buffer, len);
+ c->status.decryptin = true;
+ c->status.encryptout = true;
+ c->allow_request = CHALLENGE;
- /* Decrypt the meta key */
+ return send_challenge(c);
+}
+
+bool metakey_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
+ if(c->protocol_minor >= 2)
+ return metakey_ec_h(c, request);
- if(RSA_private_decrypt(len, (unsigned char *)buffer, (unsigned char *)c->inkey, myself->connection->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) { /* See challenge() */
- logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during decryption of meta key for %s (%s)",
- c->name, c->hostname);
+ char hexkey[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
+ int cipher, digest, maclength, compression;
+ size_t len = rsa_size(&myself->connection->rsa);
+ char enckey[len];
+ char key[len];
+
+ if(sscanf(request, "%*d %d %d %d %d " MAX_STRING, &cipher, &digest, &maclength, &compression, hexkey) != 5) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "METAKEY", c->name, c->hostname);
return false;
}
- ifdebug(SCARY_THINGS) {
- bin2hex(c->inkey, buffer, len);
- buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
- logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Received random meta key (unencrypted): %s", buffer);
- }
+ /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
- /* All incoming requests will now be encrypted. */
+ int inlen = hex2bin(hexkey, enckey, sizeof enckey);
- /* Check and lookup cipher and digest algorithms */
+ /* Check if the length of the meta key is all right */
- if(cipher) {
- c->incipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(cipher);
-
- if(!c->incipher) {
- logger(LOG_ERR, "%s (%s) uses unknown cipher!", c->name, c->hostname);
- return false;
- }
+ if(inlen != len) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong keylength");
+ return false;
+ }
- if(!EVP_DecryptInit(c->inctx, c->incipher,
- (unsigned char *)c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len,
- (unsigned char *)c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len -
- c->incipher->iv_len)) {
- logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during initialisation of cipher from %s (%s): %s",
- c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
- return false;
- }
+ /* Decrypt the meta key */
- c->status.decryptin = true;
- } else {
- c->incipher = NULL;
+ if(!rsa_private_decrypt(&myself->connection->rsa, enckey, len, key)) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during decryption of meta key for %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
+ return false;
}
- c->inmaclength = maclength;
+ ifdebug(SCARY_THINGS) {
+ bin2hex(key, hexkey, len);
+ logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Received random meta key (unencrypted): %s", hexkey);
+ }
- if(digest) {
- c->indigest = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest);
+ /* Check and lookup cipher and digest algorithms */
- if(!c->indigest) {
- logger(LOG_ERR, "Node %s (%s) uses unknown digest!", c->name, c->hostname);
- return false;
- }
+ if(!cipher_open_by_nid(&c->incipher, cipher) || !cipher_set_key_from_rsa(&c->incipher, key, len, false)) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during initialisation of cipher from %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
+ return false;
+ }
- if(c->inmaclength > c->indigest->md_size || c->inmaclength < 0) {
- logger(LOG_ERR, "%s (%s) uses bogus MAC length!", c->name, c->hostname);
- return false;
- }
- } else {
- c->indigest = NULL;
+ if(!digest_open_by_nid(&c->indigest, digest, -1)) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during initialisation of digest from %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
+ return false;
}
- c->incompression = compression;
+ c->status.decryptin = true;
c->allow_request = CHALLENGE;
}
bool send_challenge(connection_t *c) {
- char *buffer;
- int len;
-
- /* CHECKME: what is most reasonable value for len? */
-
- len = RSA_size(c->rsa_key);
+ size_t len = c->protocol_minor >= 2 ? ECDH_SIZE : rsa_size(&c->rsa);
+ char buffer[len * 2 + 1];
- /* Allocate buffers for the challenge */
-
- buffer = alloca(2 * len + 1);
-
- c->hischallenge = xrealloc(c->hischallenge, len);
+ if(!c->hischallenge)
+ c->hischallenge = xrealloc(c->hischallenge, len);
/* Copy random data to the buffer */
- RAND_pseudo_bytes((unsigned char *)c->hischallenge, len);
+ randomize(c->hischallenge, len);
/* Convert to hex */
bin2hex(c->hischallenge, buffer, len);
- buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
/* Send the challenge */
return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHALLENGE, buffer);
}
-bool challenge_h(connection_t *c) {
+bool challenge_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
- int len;
+ size_t len = c->protocol_minor >= 2 ? ECDH_SIZE : rsa_size(&myself->connection->rsa);
+ size_t digestlen = digest_length(&c->indigest);
+ char digest[digestlen];
- if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING, buffer) != 1) {
- logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "CHALLENGE", c->name,
- c->hostname);
+ if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, buffer) != 1) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "CHALLENGE", c->name, c->hostname);
return false;
}
- len = RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key);
+ /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
+
+ int inlen = hex2bin(buffer, buffer, sizeof buffer);
/* Check if the length of the challenge is all right */
- if(strlen(buffer) != len * 2) {
- logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name,
- c->hostname, "wrong challenge length");
+ if(inlen != len) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge length");
return false;
}
- /* Allocate buffers for the challenge */
-
- c->mychallenge = xrealloc(c->mychallenge, len);
-
- /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
-
- hex2bin(buffer, c->mychallenge, len);
-
c->allow_request = CHAL_REPLY;
- /* Rest is done by send_chal_reply() */
-
- return send_chal_reply(c);
-}
-
-bool send_chal_reply(connection_t *c) {
- char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2 + 1];
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
-
/* Calculate the hash from the challenge we received */
- if(!EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->indigest)
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->mychallenge, RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key))
- || !EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, (unsigned char *)hash, NULL)) {
- logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during calculation of response for %s (%s): %s",
- c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
- return false;
- }
+ digest_create(&c->indigest, buffer, len, digest);
/* Convert the hash to a hexadecimal formatted string */
- bin2hex(hash, hash, c->indigest->md_size);
- hash[c->indigest->md_size * 2] = '\0';
+ bin2hex(digest, buffer, digestlen);
/* Send the reply */
- return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHAL_REPLY, hash);
+ return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHAL_REPLY, buffer);
}
-bool chal_reply_h(connection_t *c) {
+bool chal_reply_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
char hishash[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
- char myhash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
- if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING, hishash) != 1) {
+ if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, hishash) != 1) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "CHAL_REPLY", c->name,
c->hostname);
return false;
}
- /* Check if the length of the hash is all right */
-
- if(strlen(hishash) != c->outdigest->md_size * 2) {
- logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name,
- c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply length");
- return false;
- }
-
/* Convert the hash to binary format */
- hex2bin(hishash, hishash, c->outdigest->md_size);
+ int inlen = hex2bin(hishash, hishash, sizeof hishash);
- /* Calculate the hash from the challenge we sent */
+ /* Check if the length of the hash is all right */
- if(!EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->outdigest)
- || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->hischallenge, RSA_size(c->rsa_key))
- || !EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, (unsigned char *)myhash, NULL)) {
- logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during calculation of response from %s (%s): %s",
- c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+ if(inlen != digest_length(&c->outdigest)) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply length");
return false;
}
- /* Verify the incoming hash with the calculated hash */
-
- if(memcmp(hishash, myhash, c->outdigest->md_size)) {
- logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name,
- c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply");
- ifdebug(SCARY_THINGS) {
- bin2hex(myhash, hishash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- hishash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2] = '\0';
- logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Expected challenge reply: %s", hishash);
- }
+ /* Verify the hash */
+ if(!digest_verify(&c->outdigest, c->hischallenge, c->protocol_minor >= 2 ? ECDH_SIZE : rsa_size(&c->rsa), hishash)) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply");
return false;
}
Send an acknowledgement with the rest of the information needed.
*/
+ free(c->hischallenge);
+ c->hischallenge = NULL;
c->allow_request = ACK;
return send_ack(c);
}
+static bool send_upgrade(connection_t *c) {
+ /* Special case when protocol_minor is 1: the other end is ECDSA capable,
+ * but doesn't know our key yet. So send it now. */
+
+ char *pubkey = ecdsa_get_base64_public_key(&myself->connection->ecdsa);
+
+ if(!pubkey)
+ return false;
+
+ bool result = send_request(c, "%d %s", ACK, pubkey);
+ free(pubkey);
+ return result;
+}
+
bool send_ack(connection_t *c) {
+ if(c->protocol_minor == 1)
+ return send_upgrade(c);
+
/* ACK message contains rest of the information the other end needs
to create node_t and edge_t structures. */
}
static void send_everything(connection_t *c) {
- avl_node_t *node, *node2;
+ splay_node_t *node, *node2;
node_t *n;
subnet_t *s;
edge_t *e;
}
}
-bool ack_h(connection_t *c) {
+static bool upgrade_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
+ char pubkey[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
+
+ if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, pubkey) != 1) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "ACK", c->name, c->hostname);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if(ecdsa_active(&c->ecdsa) || read_ecdsa_public_key(c)) {
+ logger(LOG_INFO, "Already have ECDSA public key from %s (%s), not upgrading.", c->name, c->hostname);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ logger(LOG_INFO, "Got ECDSA public key from %s (%s), upgrading!", c->name, c->hostname);
+ append_config_file(c->name, "ECDSAPublicKey", pubkey);
+ c->allow_request = TERMREQ;
+ return send_termreq(c);
+}
+
+bool ack_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
+ if(c->protocol_minor == 1)
+ return upgrade_h(c, request);
+
char hisport[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
char *hisaddress;
int weight, mtu;
node_t *n;
bool choice;
- if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d %x", hisport, &weight, &options) != 3) {
+ if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d %x", hisport, &weight, &options) != 3) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "ACK", c->name,
c->hostname);
return false;
} else {
if(n->connection) {
/* Oh dear, we already have a connection to this node. */
- ifdebug(CONNECTIONS) logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Established a second connection with %s (%s), closing old connection",
- n->name, n->hostname);
+ ifdebug(CONNECTIONS) logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Established a second connection with %s (%s), closing old connection", n->connection->name, n->connection->hostname);
+
+ if(n->connection->outgoing) {
+ if(c->outgoing)
+ logger(LOG_WARNING, "Two outgoing connections to the same node!");
+ else
+ c->outgoing = n->connection->outgoing;
+
+ n->connection->outgoing = NULL;
+ }
+
terminate_connection(n->connection, false);
/* Run graph algorithm to purge key and make sure up/down scripts are rerun with new IP addresses and stuff */
graph();
c->options &= ~OPTION_CLAMP_MSS;
}
+ if(c->protocol_minor > 0)
+ c->node->status.ecdh = true;
+
/* Activate this connection */
c->allow_request = ALL;