+After the correct challenge replies are received, both ends have proved
+their identity. Further information is exchanged.
+
+client ACK 655 123 0
+ | | +-> options
+ | +----> estimated weight
+ +--------> listening port of client
+
+server ACK 655 321 0
+ | | +-> options
+ | +----> estimated weight
+ +--------> listening port of server
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------
+@end example
+
+This new scheme has several improvements, both in efficiency and security.
+
+First of all, the server sends exactly the same kind of messages over the wire
+as the client. The previous versions of tinc first authenticated the client,
+and then the server. This scheme even allows both sides to send their messages
+simultaneously, there is no need to wait for the other to send something first.
+This means that any calculations that need to be done upon sending or receiving
+a message can also be done in parallel. This is especially important when doing
+RSA encryption/decryption. Given that these calculations are the main part of
+the CPU time spent for the authentication, speed is improved by a factor 2.
+
+Second, only one RSA encrypted message is sent instead of two. This reduces the
+amount of information attackers can see (and thus use for a cryptographic
+attack). It also improves speed by a factor two, making the total speedup a
+factor 4.
+
+Third, and most important:
+The symmetric cipher keys are exchanged first, the challenge is done
+afterwards. In the previous authentication scheme, because a man-in-the-middle
+could pass the challenge/chal_reply phase (by just copying the messages between
+the two real tinc daemons), but no information was exchanged that was really
+needed to read the rest of the messages, the challenge/chal_reply phase was of
+no real use. The man-in-the-middle was only stopped by the fact that only after
+the ACK messages were encrypted with the symmetric cipher. Potentially, it
+could even send it's own symmetric key to the server (if it knew the server's
+public key) and read some of the metadata the server would send it (it was
+impossible for the mitm to read actual network packets though). The new scheme
+however prevents this.
+
+This new scheme makes sure that first of all, symmetric keys are exchanged. The
+rest of the messages are then encrypted with the symmetric cipher. Then, each
+side can only read received messages if they have their private key. The
+challenge is there to let the other side know that the private key is really
+known, because a challenge reply can only be sent back if the challenge is
+decrypted correctly, and that can only be done with knowledge of the private
+key.
+
+Fourth: the first thing that is sent via the symmetric cipher encrypted
+connection is a totally random string, so that there is no known plaintext (for
+an attacker) in the beginning of the encrypted stream.
+
+
+@c ==================================================================
+@node Encryption of network packets
+@subsection Encryption of network packets
+@cindex encryption
+
+A data packet can only be sent if the encryption key is known to both
+parties, and the connection is activated. If the encryption key is not
+known, a request is sent to the destination using the meta connection
+to retrieve it. The packet is stored in a queue while waiting for the
+key to arrive.
+
+@cindex UDP
+The UDP packet containing the network packet from the VPN has the following layout:
+
+@example
+... | IP header | UDP header | seqno | VPN packet | MAC | UDP trailer
+ \___________________/\_____/
+ | |
+ V +---> digest algorithm
+ Encrypted with symmetric cipher
+@end example
+
+So, the entire VPN packet is encrypted using a symmetric cipher, including a 32 bits
+sequence number that is added in front of the actual VPN packet, to act as a unique
+IV for each packet and to prevent replay attacks. A message authentication code
+is added to the UDP packet to prevent alteration of packets. By default the
+first 4 bytes of the digest are used for this, but this can be changed using
+the MACLength configuration variable.
+
+@c ==================================================================
+@node Security issues
+@subsection Security issues
+
+In August 2000, we discovered the existence of a security hole in all versions
+of tinc up to and including 1.0pre2. This had to do with the way we exchanged
+keys. Since then, we have been working on a new authentication scheme to make
+tinc as secure as possible. The current version uses the OpenSSL library and
+uses strong authentication with RSA keys.
+
+On the 29th of December 2001, Jerome Etienne posted a security analysis of tinc
+1.0pre4. Due to a lack of sequence numbers and a message authentication code
+for each packet, an attacker could possibly disrupt certain network services or
+launch a denial of service attack by replaying intercepted packets. The current
+version adds sequence numbers and message authentication codes to prevent such
+attacks.
+
+On the 15th of September 2003, Peter Gutmann posted a security analysis of tinc
+1.0.1. He argues that the 32 bit sequence number used by tinc is not a good IV,
+that tinc's default length of 4 bytes for the MAC is too short, and he doesn't
+like tinc's use of RSA during authentication. We do not know of a security hole
+in this version of tinc, but tinc's security is not as strong as TLS or IPsec.
+We will address these issues in tinc 2.0.
+
+Cryptography is a hard thing to get right. We cannot make any
+guarantees. Time, review and feedback are the only things that can
+prove the security of any cryptographic product. If you wish to review
+tinc or give us feedback, you are stronly encouraged to do so.
+
+
+@c ==================================================================
+@node Platform specific information
+@chapter Platform specific information
+
+@menu
+* Interface configuration::
+* Routes::
+@end menu
+
+@c ==================================================================
+@node Interface configuration
+@section Interface configuration
+
+When configuring an interface, one normally assigns it an address and a
+netmask. The address uniquely identifies the host on the network attached to
+the interface. The netmask, combined with the address, forms a subnet. It is
+used to add a route to the routing table instructing the kernel to send all
+packets which fall into that subnet to that interface. Because all packets for
+the entire VPN should go to the virtual network interface used by tinc, the
+netmask should be such that it encompasses the entire VPN.
+
+For IPv4 addresses:
+
+@multitable {Darwin (MacOS/X)} {ifconfig route add -bla network address netmask netmask prefixlength interface}
+@item Linux
+@tab @code{ifconfig} @var{interface} @var{address} @code{netmask} @var{netmask}
+@item Linux iproute2
+@tab @code{ip addr add} @var{address}@code{/}@var{prefixlength} @code{dev} @var{interface}
+@item FreeBSD
+@tab @code{ifconfig} @var{interface} @var{address} @code{netmask} @var{netmask}
+@item OpenBSD
+@tab @code{ifconfig} @var{interface} @var{address} @code{netmask} @var{netmask}
+@item NetBSD
+@tab @code{ifconfig} @var{interface} @var{address} @code{netmask} @var{netmask}
+@item Solaris
+@tab @code{ifconfig} @var{interface} @var{address} @code{netmask} @var{netmask}
+@item Darwin (MacOS/X)
+@tab @code{ifconfig} @var{interface} @var{address} @code{netmask} @var{netmask}
+@item Windows
+@tab @code{netsh interface ip set address} @var{interface} @code{static} @var{address} @var{netmask}
+@end multitable
+
+For IPv6 addresses:
+
+@multitable {Darwin (MacOS/X)} {ifconfig route add -bla network address netmask netmask prefixlength interface}
+@item Linux
+@tab @code{ifconfig} @var{interface} @code{add} @var{address}@code{/}@var{prefixlength}
+@item FreeBSD
+@tab @code{ifconfig} @var{interface} @code{inet6} @var{address} @code{prefixlen} @var{prefixlength}
+@item OpenBSD
+@tab @code{ifconfig} @var{interface} @code{inet6} @var{address} @code{prefixlen} @var{prefixlength}
+@item NetBSD
+@tab @code{ifconfig} @var{interface} @code{inet6} @var{address} @code{prefixlen} @var{prefixlength}
+@item Solaris
+@tab @code{ifconfig} @var{interface} @code{inet6 plumb up}
+@item
+@tab @code{ifconfig} @var{interface} @code{inet6 addif} @var{address} @var{address}
+@item Darwin (MacOS/X)
+@tab @code{ifconfig} @var{interface} @code{inet6} @var{address} @code{prefixlen} @var{prefixlength}
+@item Windows
+@tab @code{netsh interface ipv6 add address} @var{interface} @code{static} @var{address}/@var{prefixlength}
+@end multitable
+
+On some platforms, when running tinc in switch mode, the VPN interface must be set to tap mode with an ifconfig command:
+
+@multitable {Darwin (MacOS/X)} {ifconfig route add -bla network address netmask netmask prefixlength interface}
+@item OpenBSD
+@tab @code{ifconfig} @var{interface} @code{link0}
+@end multitable
+
+On Linux, it is possible to create a persistent tun/tap interface which will
+continue to exist even if tinc quit, although this is normally not required.
+It can be useful to set up a tun/tap interface owned by a non-root user, so
+tinc can be started without needing any root privileges at all.
+
+@multitable {Darwin (MacOS/X)} {ifconfig route add -bla network address netmask netmask prefixlength interface}
+@item Linux
+@tab @code{ip tuntap add dev} @var{interface} @code{mode} @var{tun|tap} @code{user} @var{username}
+@end multitable