/*
protocol_auth.c -- handle the meta-protocol, authentication
- Copyright (C) 1999-2002 Ivo Timmermans <ivo@o2w.nl>,
- 2000-2002 Guus Sliepen <guus@sliepen.eu.org>
+ Copyright (C) 1999-2005 Ivo Timmermans,
+ 2000-2022 Guus Sliepen <guus@tinc-vpn.org>
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
- You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
- Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
-
- $Id: protocol_auth.c,v 1.1.4.15 2002/09/09 19:39:59 guus Exp $
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
+ with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
+ 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
*/
-#include "config.h"
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <syslog.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-
-#include <utils.h>
-#include <xalloc.h>
-#include <avl_tree.h>
-
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-#ifndef HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES
-#define RAND_pseudo_bytes RAND_bytes
-#endif
+#include "system.h"
#include "conf.h"
-#include "net.h"
-#include "netutl.h"
-#include "protocol.h"
-#include "meta.h"
#include "connection.h"
-#include "node.h"
+#include "control.h"
+#include "control_common.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "ecdsa.h"
#include "edge.h"
#include "graph.h"
+#include "logger.h"
+#include "meta.h"
+#include "names.h"
+#include "net.h"
+#include "netutl.h"
+#include "node.h"
+#include "protocol.h"
+#include "rsa.h"
+#include "script.h"
+#include "sptps.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+#include "xalloc.h"
+#include "random.h"
+#include "compression.h"
+#include "proxy.h"
+
+#include "ed25519/sha512.h"
+#include "keys.h"
+
+/* If nonzero, use null ciphers and skip all key exchanges. */
+bool bypass_security = false;
+
+int invitation_lifetime;
+ecdsa_t *invitation_key = NULL;
+
+static bool send_proxyrequest(connection_t *c) {
+ switch(proxytype) {
+ case PROXY_HTTP: {
+ char *host;
+ char *port;
+
+ sockaddr2str(&c->address, &host, &port);
+ send_request(c, "CONNECT %s:%s HTTP/1.1\r\n\r", host, port);
+ free(host);
+ free(port);
+ return true;
+ }
-#include "system.h"
+ case PROXY_SOCKS4:
+ case PROXY_SOCKS5: {
+ size_t reqlen = socks_req_len(proxytype, &c->address);
+ uint8_t *req = alloca(reqlen);
+ c->tcplen = create_socks_req(proxytype, req, &c->address);
+ return c->tcplen ? send_meta(c, req, reqlen) : false;
+ }
-int send_id(connection_t *c)
-{
- cp();
- return send_request(c, "%d %s %d", ID, myself->connection->name, myself->connection->protocol_version);
+ case PROXY_SOCKS4A:
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Proxy type not implemented yet");
+ return false;
+
+ case PROXY_EXEC:
+ return true;
+
+ default:
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Unknown proxy type");
+ return false;
+ }
}
-int id_h(connection_t *c)
-{
- char name[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
- int bla;
- cp();
- if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d "MAX_STRING" %d", name, &c->protocol_version) != 2)
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "ID", c->name, c->hostname);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Check if identity is a valid name */
-
- if(check_id(name))
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s): %s"), "ID", c->name, c->hostname, "invalid name");
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* If we set c->name in advance, make sure we are connected to the right host */
-
- if(c->name)
- {
- if(strcmp(c->name, name))
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Peer %s is %s instead of %s"), c->hostname, name, c->name);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- else
- c->name = xstrdup(name);
-
- /* Check if version matches */
-
- if(c->protocol_version != myself->connection->protocol_version)
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Peer %s (%s) uses incompatible version %d"),
- c->name, c->hostname, c->protocol_version);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if(bypass_security)
- {
- if(!c->config_tree)
- init_configuration(&c->config_tree);
- c->allow_request = ACK;
- return send_ack(c);
- }
-
- if(!c->config_tree)
- {
- init_configuration(&c->config_tree);
-
- bla = read_connection_config(c);
-
- if(bla)
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Peer %s had unknown identity (%s)"), c->hostname, c->name);
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- if(read_rsa_public_key(c))
- {
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Check some options */
-
- if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "IndirectData"), &bla) && bla) || myself->options & OPTION_INDIRECT)
- c->options |= OPTION_INDIRECT;
-
- if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "TCPOnly"), &bla) && bla) || myself->options & OPTION_TCPONLY)
- c->options |= OPTION_TCPONLY | OPTION_INDIRECT;
-
- c->allow_request = METAKEY;
- cp();
- return send_metakey(c);
+bool send_id(connection_t *c) {
+ gettimeofday(&c->start, NULL);
+
+ int minor = 0;
+
+ if(experimental) {
+ if(c->outgoing && !read_ecdsa_public_key(&c->ecdsa, &c->config_tree, c->name)) {
+ minor = 1;
+ } else {
+ minor = myself->connection->protocol_minor;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(proxytype && c->outgoing)
+ if(!send_proxyrequest(c)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return send_request(c, "%d %s %d.%d", ID, myself->connection->name, myself->connection->protocol_major, minor);
}
-int send_metakey(connection_t *c)
-{
- char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
- int len, x;
- cp();
- len = RSA_size(c->rsa_key);
-
- /* Allocate buffers for the meta key */
-
- if(!c->outkey)
- c->outkey = xmalloc(len);
-
- if(!c->outctx)
- c->outctx = xmalloc(sizeof(*c->outctx));
- cp();
- /* Copy random data to the buffer */
-
- RAND_bytes(c->outkey, len);
-
- /* The message we send must be smaller than the modulus of the RSA key.
- By definition, for a key of k bits, the following formula holds:
-
- 2^(k-1) <= modulus < 2^(k)
-
- Where ^ means "to the power of", not "xor".
- This means that to be sure, we must choose our message < 2^(k-1).
- This can be done by setting the most significant bit to zero.
- */
-
- c->outkey[0] &= 0x7F;
-
- if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS)
- {
- bin2hex(c->outkey, buffer, len);
- buffer[len*2] = '\0';
- syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Generated random meta key (unencrypted): %s"), buffer);
- }
-
- /* Encrypt the random data
-
- We do not use one of the PKCS padding schemes here.
- This is allowed, because we encrypt a totally random string
- with a length equal to that of the modulus of the RSA key.
- */
-
- if(RSA_public_encrypt(len, c->outkey, buffer, c->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len)
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)"), c->name, c->hostname);
- return -1;
- }
- cp();
- /* Convert the encrypted random data to a hexadecimal formatted string */
-
- bin2hex(buffer, buffer, len);
- buffer[len*2] = '\0';
-
- /* Send the meta key */
-
- x = send_request(c, "%d %d %d %d %d %s", METAKEY,
- c->outcipher?c->outcipher->nid:0, c->outdigest?c->outdigest->type:0,
- c->outmaclength, c->outcompression, buffer);
-
- /* Further outgoing requests are encrypted with the key we just generated */
-
- if(c->outcipher)
- {
- EVP_EncryptInit(c->outctx, c->outcipher,
- c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len,
- c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len - c->outcipher->iv_len);
-
- c->status.encryptout = 1;
- }
- cp();
- return x;
+static bool finalize_invitation(connection_t *c, const char *data, uint16_t len) {
+ (void)len;
+
+ if(strchr(data, '\n')) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Received invalid key from invited node %s (%s)!\n", c->name, c->hostname);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // Create a new host config file
+ char filename[PATH_MAX];
+ snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s" SLASH "hosts" SLASH "%s", confbase, c->name);
+
+ if(!access(filename, F_OK)) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Host config file for %s (%s) already exists!\n", c->name, c->hostname);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ FILE *f = fopen(filename, "w");
+
+ if(!f) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Error trying to create %s: %s\n", filename, strerror(errno));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ fprintf(f, "Ed25519PublicKey = %s\n", data);
+ fclose(f);
+
+ logger(DEBUG_CONNECTIONS, LOG_INFO, "Key successfully received from %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
+
+ // Call invitation-accepted script
+ environment_t env;
+ char *address, *port;
+
+ environment_init(&env);
+ environment_add(&env, "NODE=%s", c->name);
+ sockaddr2str(&c->address, &address, &port);
+ environment_add(&env, "REMOTEADDRESS=%s", address);
+ environment_add(&env, "NAME=%s", myself->name);
+
+ free(address);
+ free(port);
+
+ execute_script("invitation-accepted", &env);
+
+ environment_exit(&env);
+
+ sptps_send_record(&c->sptps, 2, data, 0);
+ return true;
}
-int metakey_h(connection_t *c)
-{
- char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
- int cipher, digest, maclength, compression;
- int len;
- cp();
- if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d %d %d %d %d "MAX_STRING, &cipher, &digest, &maclength, &compression, buffer) != 5)
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "METAKEY", c->name, c->hostname);
- return -1;
- }
- cp();
- len = RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key);
-
- /* Check if the length of the meta key is all right */
-
- if(strlen(buffer) != len*2)
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name, c->hostname, "wrong keylength");
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Allocate buffers for the meta key */
- cp();
- if(!c->inkey)
- c->inkey = xmalloc(len);
-
- if(!c->inctx)
- c->inctx = xmalloc(sizeof(*c->inctx));
-
- /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
- cp();
- hex2bin(buffer,buffer,len);
-
- /* Decrypt the meta key */
- cp();
- if(RSA_private_decrypt(len, buffer, c->inkey, myself->connection->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) /* See challenge() */
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)"), c->name, c->hostname);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS)
- {
- bin2hex(c->inkey, buffer, len);
- buffer[len*2] = '\0';
- syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Received random meta key (unencrypted): %s"), buffer);
- }
-
- /* All incoming requests will now be encrypted. */
- cp();
- /* Check and lookup cipher and digest algorithms */
-
- if(cipher)
- {
- c->incipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(cipher);
- if(!c->incipher)
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("%s (%s) uses unknown cipher!"), c->name, c->hostname);
- return -1;
- }
-
- EVP_DecryptInit(c->inctx, c->incipher,
- c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len,
- c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len - c->incipher->iv_len);
-
- c->status.decryptin = 1;
- }
- else
- {
- c->incipher = NULL;
- }
-
- c->inmaclength = maclength;
-
- if(digest)
- {
- c->indigest = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest);
- if(!c->indigest)
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Node %s (%s) uses unknown digest!"), c->name, c->hostname);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if(c->inmaclength > c->indigest->md_size || c->inmaclength < 0)
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("%s (%s) uses bogus MAC length!"), c->name, c->hostname);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- else
- {
- c->indigest = NULL;
- }
-
- c->incompression = compression;
-
- c->allow_request = CHALLENGE;
- cp();
- return send_challenge(c);
+static bool receive_invitation_sptps(void *handle, uint8_t type, const void *data, uint16_t len) {
+ connection_t *c = handle;
+
+ if(type == 128) {
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ if(type == 1 && c->status.invitation_used) {
+ return finalize_invitation(c, data, len);
+ }
+
+ if(type != 0 || len != 18 || c->status.invitation_used) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // Recover the filename from the cookie and the key
+ char *fingerprint = ecdsa_get_base64_public_key(invitation_key);
+ const size_t hashbuflen = 18 + strlen(fingerprint);
+ char *hashbuf = alloca(hashbuflen);
+ char cookie[64];
+ memcpy(hashbuf, data, 18);
+ memcpy(hashbuf + 18, fingerprint, hashbuflen - 18);
+ sha512(hashbuf, hashbuflen, cookie);
+ b64encode_tinc_urlsafe(cookie, cookie, 18);
+ free(fingerprint);
+
+ char filename[PATH_MAX], usedname[PATH_MAX];
+ snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s" SLASH "invitations" SLASH "%s", confbase, cookie);
+ snprintf(usedname, sizeof(usedname), "%s" SLASH "invitations" SLASH "%s.used", confbase, cookie);
+
+ // Atomically rename the invitation file
+ if(rename(filename, usedname)) {
+ if(errno == ENOENT) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Peer %s tried to use non-existing invitation %s\n", c->hostname, cookie);
+ } else {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Error trying to rename invitation %s\n", cookie);
+ }
+
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // Check the timestamp of the invitation
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if(stat(usedname, &st)) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Could not stat %s", usedname);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if(st.st_mtime + invitation_lifetime < now.tv_sec) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Peer %s tried to use expired invitation %s", c->hostname, cookie);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // Open the renamed file
+ FILE *f = fopen(usedname, "r");
+
+ if(!f) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Error trying to open invitation %s\n", cookie);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // Read the new node's Name from the file
+ char buf[1024] = "";
+
+ if(!fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Could not read invitation file %s\n", cookie);
+ fclose(f);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ size_t buflen = strlen(buf);
+
+ // Strip whitespace at the end
+ while(buflen && strchr(" \t\r\n", buf[buflen - 1])) {
+ buf[--buflen] = 0;
+ }
+
+ // Split the first line into variable and value
+ len = strcspn(buf, " \t=");
+ char *name = buf + len;
+ name += strspn(name, " \t");
+
+ if(*name == '=') {
+ name++;
+ name += strspn(name, " \t");
+ }
+
+ buf[len] = 0;
+
+ // Check that it is a valid Name
+ if(!*buf || !*name || strcasecmp(buf, "Name") || !check_id(name) || !strcmp(name, myself->name)) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Invalid invitation file %s\n", cookie);
+ fclose(f);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ free(c->name);
+ c->name = xstrdup(name);
+
+ // Send the node the contents of the invitation file
+ rewind(f);
+ size_t result;
+
+ while((result = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), f))) {
+ sptps_send_record(&c->sptps, 0, buf, result);
+ }
+
+ if(!feof(f)) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Could not read invitation file %s\n", cookie);
+ fclose(f);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ sptps_send_record(&c->sptps, 1, buf, 0);
+ fclose(f);
+ unlink(usedname);
+
+ c->status.invitation_used = true;
+
+ logger(DEBUG_CONNECTIONS, LOG_INFO, "Invitation %s successfully sent to %s (%s)", cookie, c->name, c->hostname);
+ return true;
}
-int send_challenge(connection_t *c)
-{
- char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
- int len, x;
- cp();
- /* CHECKME: what is most reasonable value for len? */
+bool id_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
+ char name[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
+
+ if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %2d.%3d", name, &c->protocol_major, &c->protocol_minor) < 2) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "ID", c->name,
+ c->hostname);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if this is a control connection */
+
+ if(name[0] == '^' && !strcmp(name + 1, controlcookie)) {
+ c->status.control = true;
+ c->allow_request = CONTROL;
+ c->last_ping_time = now.tv_sec + 3600;
+
+ free(c->name);
+ c->name = xstrdup("<control>");
+
+ if(!c->outgoing) {
+ send_id(c);
+ }
+
+ return send_request(c, "%d %d %d", ACK, TINC_CTL_VERSION_CURRENT, getpid());
+ }
+
+ if(name[0] == '?') {
+ if(!invitation_key) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Got invitation from %s but we don't have an invitation key", c->hostname);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ c->ecdsa = ecdsa_set_base64_public_key(name + 1);
+
+ if(!c->ecdsa) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Got bad invitation from %s", c->hostname);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ c->status.invitation = true;
+ char *mykey = ecdsa_get_base64_public_key(invitation_key);
+
+ if(!mykey) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if(!c->outgoing) {
+ send_id(c);
+ }
+
+ if(!send_request(c, "%d %s", ACK, mykey)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ free(mykey);
+
+ c->protocol_minor = 2;
+
+ return sptps_start(&c->sptps, c, false, false, invitation_key, c->ecdsa, "tinc invitation", 15, send_meta_sptps, receive_invitation_sptps);
+ }
+
+ /* Check if identity is a valid name */
+
+ if(!check_id(name) || !strcmp(name, myself->name)) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s): %s", "ID", c->name,
+ c->hostname, "invalid name");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /* If this is an outgoing connection, make sure we are connected to the right host */
+
+ if(c->outgoing) {
+ if(strcmp(c->name, name)) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Peer %s is %s instead of %s", c->hostname, name,
+ c->name);
+ return false;
+ }
+ } else {
+ free(c->name);
+ c->name = xstrdup(name);
+ }
+
+ /* Check if version matches */
+
+ if(c->protocol_major != myself->connection->protocol_major) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Peer %s (%s) uses incompatible version %d.%d",
+ c->name, c->hostname, c->protocol_major, c->protocol_minor);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if(bypass_security) {
+ if(!c->config_tree) {
+ c->config_tree = create_configuration();
+ }
+
+ c->allow_request = ACK;
- len = RSA_size(c->rsa_key);
+ if(!c->outgoing) {
+ send_id(c);
+ }
- /* Allocate buffers for the challenge */
+ return send_ack(c);
+ }
+
+ if(!experimental) {
+ c->protocol_minor = 0;
+ }
+
+ if(!c->config_tree) {
+ c->config_tree = create_configuration();
+
+ if(!read_host_config(c->config_tree, c->name, false)) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Peer %s had unknown identity (%s)", c->hostname, c->name);
+ return false;
+ }
- if(!c->hischallenge)
- c->hischallenge = xmalloc(len);
- cp();
- /* Copy random data to the buffer */
+ if(experimental) {
+ read_ecdsa_public_key(&c->ecdsa, &c->config_tree, c->name);
+ }
- RAND_bytes(c->hischallenge, len);
+ /* Ignore failures if no key known yet */
+ }
- cp();
- /* Convert to hex */
+ if(c->protocol_minor && !ecdsa_active(c->ecdsa)) {
+ c->protocol_minor = 1;
+ }
- bin2hex(c->hischallenge, buffer, len);
- buffer[len*2] = '\0';
+ /* Forbid version rollback for nodes whose Ed25519 key we know */
- cp();
- /* Send the challenge */
+ if(ecdsa_active(c->ecdsa) && c->protocol_minor < 1) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Peer %s (%s) tries to roll back protocol version to %d.%d",
+ c->name, c->hostname, c->protocol_major, c->protocol_minor);
+ return false;
+ }
- x = send_request(c, "%d %s", CHALLENGE, buffer);
- cp();
- return x;
+ c->allow_request = METAKEY;
+
+ if(!c->outgoing) {
+ send_id(c);
+ }
+
+ if(c->protocol_minor >= 2) {
+ c->allow_request = ACK;
+
+ const size_t labellen = 25 + strlen(myself->name) + strlen(c->name);
+ char *label = alloca(labellen);
+
+ if(c->outgoing) {
+ snprintf(label, labellen, "tinc TCP key expansion %s %s", myself->name, c->name);
+ } else {
+ snprintf(label, labellen, "tinc TCP key expansion %s %s", c->name, myself->name);
+ }
+
+ return sptps_start(&c->sptps, c, c->outgoing, false, myself->connection->ecdsa, c->ecdsa, label, labellen, send_meta_sptps, receive_meta_sptps);
+ } else {
+ return send_metakey(c);
+ }
}
-int challenge_h(connection_t *c)
-{
- char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
- int len;
- cp();
- if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d "MAX_STRING, buffer) != 1)
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "CHALLENGE", c->name, c->hostname);
- return -1;
- }
+#ifndef DISABLE_LEGACY
+static const char *get_cipher_name(cipher_t *cipher) {
+ size_t keylen = cipher_keylength(cipher);
+
+ if(keylen <= 16) {
+ return "aes-128-cfb";
+ } else if(keylen <= 24) {
+ return "aes-192-cfb";
+ } else {
+ return "aes-256-cfb";
+ }
+}
+
+bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
+ if(!myself->connection->legacy) {
+ logger(DEBUG_CONNECTIONS, LOG_ERR, "Peer %s (%s) uses legacy protocol which we don't support", c->name, c->hostname);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ rsa_t *rsa = read_rsa_public_key(c->config_tree, c->name);
+
+ if(!rsa) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ legacy_ctx_t *ctx = new_legacy_ctx(rsa);
+
+ /* We need to use a stream mode for the meta protocol. Use AES for this,
+ but try to match the key size with the one from the cipher selected
+ by Cipher.
+ */
- len = RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key);
+ const char *cipher_name = get_cipher_name(myself->incipher);
- /* Check if the length of the challenge is all right */
+ if(!init_crypto_by_name(&ctx->out, cipher_name, "sha256")) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Error during initialisation of cipher or digest to %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
+ free_legacy_ctx(ctx);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ const size_t len = rsa_size(ctx->rsa);
+ const size_t hexkeylen = HEX_SIZE(len);
+ char *key = alloca(len);
+ char *enckey = alloca(len);
+ char *hexkey = alloca(hexkeylen);
- if(strlen(buffer) != len*2)
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge length");
- return -1;
- }
+ /* Create a random key */
- /* Allocate buffers for the challenge */
+ randomize(key, len);
- if(!c->mychallenge)
- c->mychallenge = xmalloc(len);
+ /* The message we send must be smaller than the modulus of the RSA key.
+ By definition, for a key of k bits, the following formula holds:
- /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
+ 2^(k-1) <= modulus < 2^(k)
- hex2bin(buffer,c->mychallenge,len);
+ Where ^ means "to the power of", not "xor".
+ This means that to be sure, we must choose our message < 2^(k-1).
+ This can be done by setting the most significant bit to zero.
+ */
- c->allow_request = CHAL_REPLY;
+ key[0] &= 0x7F;
- /* Rest is done by send_chal_reply() */
- cp();
- return send_chal_reply(c);
+ if(!cipher_set_key_from_rsa(&ctx->out.cipher, key, len, true)) {
+ free_legacy_ctx(ctx);
+ memzero(key, len);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if(debug_level >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS) {
+ bin2hex(key, hexkey, len);
+ logger(DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS, LOG_DEBUG, "Generated random meta key (unencrypted): %s", hexkey);
+ memzero(hexkey, hexkeylen);
+ }
+
+ /* Encrypt the random data
+
+ We do not use one of the PKCS padding schemes here.
+ This is allowed, because we encrypt a totally random string
+ with a length equal to that of the modulus of the RSA key.
+ */
+
+ bool encrypted = rsa_public_encrypt(ctx->rsa, key, len, enckey);
+ memzero(key, len);
+
+ if(!encrypted) {
+ free_legacy_ctx(ctx);
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ free_legacy_ctx(c->legacy);
+ c->legacy = ctx;
+
+ /* Convert the encrypted random data to a hexadecimal formatted string */
+
+ bin2hex(enckey, hexkey, len);
+
+ /* Send the meta key */
+
+ bool result = send_request(c, "%d %d %d %d %d %s", METAKEY,
+ cipher_get_nid(&c->legacy->out.cipher),
+ digest_get_nid(&c->legacy->out.digest), c->outmaclength,
+ COMPRESS_NONE, hexkey);
+
+ c->status.encryptout = true;
+ return result;
}
-int send_chal_reply(connection_t *c)
-{
- char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2+1];
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
- cp();
- /* Calculate the hash from the challenge we received */
+bool metakey_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
+ if(!myself->connection->legacy || !c->legacy) {
+ return false;
+ }
- EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->indigest);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->mychallenge, RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key));
- EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, hash, NULL);
+ char hexkey[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
+ int cipher, digest;
+ const size_t len = rsa_size(myself->connection->legacy->rsa);
+ char *enckey = alloca(len);
+ char *key = alloca(len);
- /* Convert the hash to a hexadecimal formatted string */
+ if(sscanf(request, "%*d %d %d %*d %*d " MAX_STRING, &cipher, &digest, hexkey) != 3) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "METAKEY", c->name, c->hostname);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if(!cipher || !digest) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): cipher %d, digest %d", c->name, c->hostname, cipher, digest);
+ return false;
+ }
- bin2hex(hash,hash,c->indigest->md_size);
- hash[c->indigest->md_size*2] = '\0';
+ /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
+
+ size_t inlen = hex2bin(hexkey, enckey, len);
+
+ /* Check if the length of the meta key is all right */
+
+ if(inlen != len) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong keylength");
+ return false;
+ }
- /* Send the reply */
+ /* Decrypt the meta key */
- cp();
- return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHAL_REPLY, hash);
+ if(!rsa_private_decrypt(myself->connection->legacy->rsa, enckey, len, key)) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Error during decryption of meta key for %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if(debug_level >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS) {
+ bin2hex(key, hexkey, len);
+ logger(DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS, LOG_DEBUG, "Received random meta key (unencrypted): %s", hexkey);
+ // Hopefully the user knew what he was doing leaking session keys into logs. We'll do the right thing here anyway.
+ memzero(hexkey, HEX_SIZE(len));
+ }
+
+ /* Check and lookup cipher and digest algorithms */
+
+ if(!init_crypto_by_nid(&c->legacy->in, cipher, digest)) {
+ memzero(key, len);
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Error during initialisation of cipher or digest from %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ bool key_set = cipher_set_key_from_rsa(&c->legacy->in.cipher, key, len, false);
+ memzero(key, len);
+
+ if(!key_set) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Error setting RSA key for %s (%s)", c->name, c->hostname);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ c->status.decryptin = true;
+
+ c->allow_request = CHALLENGE;
+
+ return send_challenge(c);
+}
+
+bool send_challenge(connection_t *c) {
+ const size_t len = rsa_size(c->legacy->rsa);
+ char *buffer = alloca(len * 2 + 1);
+
+ c->hischallenge = xrealloc(c->hischallenge, len);
+
+ /* Copy random data to the buffer */
+
+ randomize(c->hischallenge, len);
+
+ /* Convert to hex */
+
+ bin2hex(c->hischallenge, buffer, len);
+
+ /* Send the challenge */
+
+ return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHALLENGE, buffer);
+}
+
+bool challenge_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
+ if(!myself->connection->legacy) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
+ const size_t len = rsa_size(myself->connection->legacy->rsa);
+
+ if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, buffer) != 1) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "CHALLENGE", c->name, c->hostname);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if the length of the challenge is all right */
+
+ if(strlen(buffer) != (size_t)len * 2) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge length");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ c->mychallenge = xrealloc(c->mychallenge, len);
+
+ /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
+
+ hex2bin(buffer, c->mychallenge, len);
+
+ /* The rest is done by send_chal_reply() */
+
+ c->allow_request = CHAL_REPLY;
+
+ if(c->outgoing) {
+ return send_chal_reply(c);
+ } else {
+ return true;
+ }
+}
+
+bool send_chal_reply(connection_t *c) {
+ const size_t len = rsa_size(myself->connection->legacy->rsa);
+ size_t digestlen = digest_length(&c->legacy->in.digest);
+ char *digest = alloca(digestlen * 2 + 1);
+
+ /* Calculate the hash from the challenge we received */
+
+ if(!digest_create(&c->legacy->in.digest, c->mychallenge, len, digest)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ free(c->mychallenge);
+ c->mychallenge = NULL;
+
+ /* Convert the hash to a hexadecimal formatted string */
+
+ bin2hex(digest, digest, digestlen);
+
+ /* Send the reply */
+
+ return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHAL_REPLY, digest);
+}
+
+bool chal_reply_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
+ char hishash[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
+
+ if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, hishash) != 1) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "CHAL_REPLY", c->name,
+ c->hostname);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /* Convert the hash to binary format */
+
+ size_t inlen = hex2bin(hishash, hishash, sizeof(hishash));
+
+ /* Check if the length of the hash is all right */
+
+ if(inlen != digest_length(&c->legacy->out.digest)) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply length");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+
+ /* Verify the hash */
+
+ if(!digest_verify(&c->legacy->out.digest, c->hischallenge, rsa_size(c->legacy->rsa), hishash)) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /* Identity has now been positively verified.
+ Send an acknowledgement with the rest of the information needed.
+ */
+
+ free(c->hischallenge);
+ c->hischallenge = NULL;
+ c->allow_request = ACK;
+
+ if(!c->outgoing) {
+ send_chal_reply(c);
+ }
+
+ return send_ack(c);
+}
+
+static bool send_upgrade(connection_t *c) {
+ /* Special case when protocol_minor is 1: the other end is Ed25519 capable,
+ * but doesn't know our key yet. So send it now. */
+
+ char *pubkey = ecdsa_get_base64_public_key(myself->connection->ecdsa);
+
+ if(!pubkey) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ bool result = send_request(c, "%d %s", ACK, pubkey);
+ free(pubkey);
+ return result;
+}
+#else
+bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
+ (void)c;
+ return false;
+}
+
+bool metakey_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
+ (void)c;
+ (void)request;
+ return false;
+}
+
+bool send_challenge(connection_t *c) {
+ (void)c;
+ return false;
+}
+
+bool challenge_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
+ (void)c;
+ (void)request;
+ return false;
+}
+
+bool send_chal_reply(connection_t *c) {
+ (void)c;
+ return false;
+}
+
+bool chal_reply_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
+ (void)c;
+ (void)request;
+ return false;
}
-int chal_reply_h(connection_t *c)
-{
- char hishash[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
- char myhash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
- cp();
- if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d "MAX_STRING, hishash) != 1)
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "CHAL_REPLY", c->name, c->hostname);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Check if the length of the hash is all right */
-
- if(strlen(hishash) != c->outdigest->md_size*2)
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name, c->hostname, _("wrong challenge reply length"));
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Convert the hash to binary format */
-
- hex2bin(hishash, hishash, c->outdigest->md_size);
-
- /* Calculate the hash from the challenge we sent */
-
- EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->outdigest);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->hischallenge, RSA_size(c->rsa_key));
- EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, myhash, NULL);
-
- /* Verify the incoming hash with the calculated hash */
-
- if(memcmp(hishash, myhash, c->outdigest->md_size))
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name, c->hostname, _("wrong challenge reply"));
- if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS)
- {
- bin2hex(myhash, hishash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- hishash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH*2] = '\0';
- syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Expected challenge reply: %s"), hishash);
- }
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Identity has now been positively verified.
- Send an acknowledgement with the rest of the information needed.
- */
-
- c->allow_request = ACK;
- cp();
- return send_ack(c);
+static bool send_upgrade(connection_t *c) {
+ (void)c;
+ return false;
}
+#endif
+
+bool send_ack(connection_t *c) {
+ if(c->protocol_minor == 1) {
+ return send_upgrade(c);
+ }
+
+ /* ACK message contains rest of the information the other end needs
+ to create node_t and edge_t structures. */
+
+ struct timeval now;
+ bool choice;
+
+ /* Estimate weight */
+
+ gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
+ c->estimated_weight = (int)((now.tv_sec - c->start.tv_sec) * 1000 + (now.tv_usec - c->start.tv_usec) / 1000);
+
+ /* Check some options */
+
+ if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "IndirectData"), &choice) && choice) || myself->options & OPTION_INDIRECT) {
+ c->options |= OPTION_INDIRECT;
+ }
+
+ if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "TCPOnly"), &choice) && choice) || myself->options & OPTION_TCPONLY) {
+ c->options |= OPTION_TCPONLY | OPTION_INDIRECT;
+ }
+
+ if(myself->options & OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY && !(c->options & OPTION_TCPONLY)) {
+ c->options |= OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY;
+ }
+
+ choice = myself->options & OPTION_CLAMP_MSS;
+ get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "ClampMSS"), &choice);
+
+ if(choice) {
+ c->options |= OPTION_CLAMP_MSS;
+ }
-int send_ack(connection_t *c)
-{
- /* ACK message contains rest of the information the other end needs
- to create node_t and edge_t structures. */
-
- int x;
- struct timeval now;
- cp();
- /* Estimate weight */
-
- gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
- c->estimated_weight = (now.tv_sec - c->start.tv_sec) * 1000 + (now.tv_usec - c->start.tv_usec) / 1000;
- x = send_request(c, "%d %s %d %lx", ACK, myport, c->estimated_weight, c->options);
- cp();
- return x;
+ if(!get_config_int(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "Weight"), &c->estimated_weight)) {
+ get_config_int(lookup_config(&config_tree, "Weight"), &c->estimated_weight);
+ }
+
+ return send_request(c, "%d %s %d %x", ACK, myport.udp, c->estimated_weight, (c->options & 0xffffff) | (experimental ? (PROT_MINOR << 24) : 0));
}
-void send_everything(connection_t *c)
-{
- avl_node_t *node, *node2;
- node_t *n;
- subnet_t *s;
- edge_t *e;
-
- /* Send all known subnets and edges */
-
- for(node = node_tree->head; node; node = node->next)
- {
- n = (node_t *)node->data;
-
- for(node2 = n->subnet_tree->head; node2; node2 = node2->next)
- {
- s = (subnet_t *)node2->data;
- send_add_subnet(c, s);
- }
-
- for(node2 = n->edge_tree->head; node2; node2 = node2->next)
- {
- e = (edge_t *)node2->data;
- send_add_edge(c, e);
- }
- }
+static void send_everything(connection_t *c) {
+ /* Send all known subnets and edges */
+
+ if(disablebuggypeers) {
+ static struct {
+ vpn_packet_t pkt;
+ char pad[MAXBUFSIZE - MAXSIZE];
+ } zeropkt;
+
+ memset(&zeropkt, 0, sizeof(zeropkt));
+ zeropkt.pkt.len = MAXBUFSIZE;
+ send_tcppacket(c, &zeropkt.pkt);
+ }
+
+ if(tunnelserver) {
+ for splay_each(subnet_t, s, &myself->subnet_tree) {
+ send_add_subnet(c, s);
+ }
+
+ return;
+ }
+
+ for splay_each(node_t, n, &node_tree) {
+ for splay_each(subnet_t, s, &n->subnet_tree) {
+ send_add_subnet(c, s);
+ }
+
+ for splay_each(edge_t, e, &n->edge_tree) {
+ send_add_edge(c, e);
+ }
+ }
}
-int ack_h(connection_t *c)
-{
- char hisport[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
- char *hisaddress, *dummy;
- int weight;
- long int options;
- node_t *n;
- cp();
- if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d "MAX_STRING" %d %lx", hisport, &weight, &options) != 3)
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "ACK", c->name, c->hostname);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Check if we already have a node_t for him */
-
- n = lookup_node(c->name);
-
- if(!n)
- {
- n = new_node();
- n->name = xstrdup(c->name);
- node_add(n);
- }
- else
- {
- if(n->connection)
- {
- /* Oh dear, we already have a connection to this node. */
- if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_CONNECTIONS)
- syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Established a second connection with %s (%s), closing old connection"), n->name, n->hostname);
- terminate_connection(n->connection, 0);
- }
- }
-
- n->connection = c;
- c->node = n;
- c->options |= options;
-
- /* Activate this connection */
-
- c->allow_request = ALL;
- c->status.active = 1;
-
- if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_CONNECTIONS)
- syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("Connection with %s (%s) activated"), c->name, c->hostname);
-
- /* Send him everything we know */
-
- send_everything(c);
-
- /* Create an edge_t for this connection */
-
- c->edge = new_edge();
- cp();
- c->edge->from = myself;
- c->edge->to = n;
- sockaddr2str(&c->address, &hisaddress, &dummy);
- c->edge->address = str2sockaddr(hisaddress, hisport);
- free(hisaddress);
- free(dummy);
- c->edge->weight = (weight + c->estimated_weight) / 2;
- c->edge->connection = c;
- c->edge->options = c->options;
- cp();
- edge_add(c->edge);
-
- cp();
- /* Notify everyone of the new edge */
-
- send_add_edge(broadcast, c->edge);
-
- /* Run MST and SSSP algorithms */
-
- graph();
- cp();
- return 0;
+static bool upgrade_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
+ char pubkey[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
+
+ if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, pubkey) != 1) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "ACK", c->name, c->hostname);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if(ecdsa_active(c->ecdsa) || read_ecdsa_public_key(&c->ecdsa, &c->config_tree, c->name)) {
+ char *knownkey = ecdsa_get_base64_public_key(c->ecdsa);
+ bool different = strcmp(knownkey, pubkey);
+ free(knownkey);
+
+ if(different) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Already have an Ed25519 public key from %s (%s) which is different from the one presented now!", c->name, c->hostname);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_INFO, "Already have Ed25519 public key from %s (%s), ignoring.", c->name, c->hostname);
+ c->allow_request = TERMREQ;
+ return send_termreq(c);
+ }
+
+ c->ecdsa = ecdsa_set_base64_public_key(pubkey);
+
+ if(!c->ecdsa) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_INFO, "Got bad Ed25519 public key from %s (%s), not upgrading.", c->name, c->hostname);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_INFO, "Got Ed25519 public key from %s (%s), upgrading!", c->name, c->hostname);
+ append_config_file(c->name, "Ed25519PublicKey", pubkey);
+ c->allow_request = TERMREQ;
+
+ if(c->outgoing) {
+ c->outgoing->timeout = 0;
+ }
+
+ return send_termreq(c);
+}
+
+bool ack_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
+ if(c->protocol_minor == 1) {
+ return upgrade_h(c, request);
+ }
+
+ char hisport[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
+ int weight, mtu;
+ uint32_t options;
+ node_t *n;
+ bool choice;
+
+ if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d %x", hisport, &weight, &options) != 3) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "ACK", c->name,
+ c->hostname);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if we already have a node_t for him */
+
+ n = lookup_node(c->name);
+
+ if(!n) {
+ n = new_node();
+ n->name = xstrdup(c->name);
+ node_add(n);
+ } else {
+ if(n->connection) {
+ /* Oh dear, we already have a connection to this node. */
+ logger(DEBUG_CONNECTIONS, LOG_DEBUG, "Established a second connection with %s (%s), closing old connection", n->connection->name, n->connection->hostname);
+
+ if(n->connection->outgoing) {
+ if(c->outgoing) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_WARNING, "Two outgoing connections to the same node!");
+ } else {
+ c->outgoing = n->connection->outgoing;
+ }
+
+ n->connection->outgoing = NULL;
+ }
+
+ terminate_connection(n->connection, false);
+ /* Run graph algorithm to purge key and make sure up/down scripts are rerun with new IP addresses and stuff */
+ graph();
+ }
+ }
+
+ n->connection = c;
+ c->node = n;
+
+ if(!(c->options & options & OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY)) {
+ c->options &= ~OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY;
+ options &= ~OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY;
+ }
+
+ c->options |= options;
+
+ if(get_config_int(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "PMTU"), &mtu) && mtu < n->mtu) {
+ n->mtu = mtu;
+ }
+
+ if(get_config_int(lookup_config(&config_tree, "PMTU"), &mtu) && mtu < n->mtu) {
+ n->mtu = mtu;
+ }
+
+ if(get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "ClampMSS"), &choice)) {
+ if(choice) {
+ c->options |= OPTION_CLAMP_MSS;
+ } else {
+ c->options &= ~OPTION_CLAMP_MSS;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Activate this connection */
+
+ c->allow_request = ALL;
+
+ logger(DEBUG_CONNECTIONS, LOG_NOTICE, "Connection with %s (%s) activated", c->name,
+ c->hostname);
+
+ /* Send him everything we know */
+
+ send_everything(c);
+
+ /* Create an edge_t for this connection */
+
+ c->edge = new_edge();
+ c->edge->from = myself;
+ c->edge->to = n;
+ sockaddrcpy(&c->edge->address, &c->address);
+ sockaddr_setport(&c->edge->address, hisport);
+ sockaddr_t local_sa;
+ socklen_t local_salen = sizeof(local_sa);
+
+ if(getsockname(c->socket, &local_sa.sa, &local_salen) < 0) {
+ logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_WARNING, "Could not get local socket address for connection with %s", c->name);
+ } else {
+ sockaddr_setport(&local_sa, myport.udp);
+ c->edge->local_address = local_sa;
+ }
+
+ c->edge->weight = (weight + c->estimated_weight) / 2;
+ c->edge->connection = c;
+ c->edge->options = c->options;
+
+ edge_add(c->edge);
+
+ /* Notify everyone of the new edge */
+
+ if(tunnelserver) {
+ send_add_edge(c, c->edge);
+ } else {
+ send_add_edge(everyone, c->edge);
+ }
+
+ /* Run MST and SSSP algorithms */
+
+ graph();
+
+ return true;
}