X-Git-Url: https://tinc-vpn.org/git/browse?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fprotocol_auth.c;h=962f68113f667eba33b99b51ec5d335aa63387d5;hb=868104703003605711582c984b57f8933bf361ee;hp=fc0c3aae2bc7a2a9eed94d84461a41050e86ee10;hpb=f75dcef72a81a337e847adf0bae54198894f65b9;p=tinc

diff --git a/src/protocol_auth.c b/src/protocol_auth.c
index fc0c3aae..962f6811 100644
--- a/src/protocol_auth.c
+++ b/src/protocol_auth.c
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
     along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
     Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
 
-    $Id: protocol_auth.c,v 1.1.4.16 2002/09/09 21:24:45 guus Exp $
+    $Id: protocol_auth.c,v 1.1.4.20 2003/07/06 17:15:25 guus Exp $
 */
 
 #include "config.h"
@@ -37,10 +37,6 @@
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 
-#ifndef HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES
-#define RAND_pseudo_bytes RAND_bytes
-#endif
-
 #include "conf.h"
 #include "net.h"
 #include "netutl.h"
@@ -53,7 +49,7 @@
 
 #include "system.h"
 
-int send_id(connection_t * c)
+int send_id(connection_t *c)
 {
 	cp();
 
@@ -61,7 +57,7 @@ int send_id(connection_t * c)
 						myself->connection->protocol_version);
 }
 
-int id_h(connection_t * c)
+int id_h(connection_t *c)
 {
 	char name[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
 	int bla;
@@ -137,7 +133,7 @@ int id_h(connection_t * c)
 	return send_metakey(c);
 }
 
-int send_metakey(connection_t * c)
+int send_metakey(connection_t *c)
 {
 	char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
 	int len, x;
@@ -152,7 +148,7 @@ int send_metakey(connection_t * c)
 		c->outkey = xmalloc(len);
 
 	if(!c->outctx)
-		c->outctx = xmalloc(sizeof(*c->outctx));
+		c->outctx = xmalloc_and_zero(sizeof(*c->outctx));
 	cp();
 	/* Copy random data to the buffer */
 
@@ -216,7 +212,7 @@ int send_metakey(connection_t * c)
 	return x;
 }
 
-int metakey_h(connection_t * c)
+int metakey_h(connection_t *c)
 {
 	char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
 	int cipher, digest, maclength, compression;
@@ -224,9 +220,7 @@ int metakey_h(connection_t * c)
 
 	cp();
 
-	if(sscanf
-	   (c->buffer, "%*d %d %d %d %d " MAX_STRING, &cipher, &digest, &maclength,
-		&compression, buffer) != 5) {
+	if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d %d %d %d %d " MAX_STRING, &cipher, &digest, &maclength, &compression, buffer) != 5) {
 		syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "METAKEY", c->name,
 			   c->hostname);
 		return -1;
@@ -237,8 +231,7 @@ int metakey_h(connection_t * c)
 	/* Check if the length of the meta key is all right */
 
 	if(strlen(buffer) != len * 2) {
-		syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name,
-			   c->hostname, "wrong keylength");
+		syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name, c->hostname, "wrong keylength");
 		return -1;
 	}
 
@@ -248,7 +241,7 @@ int metakey_h(connection_t * c)
 		c->inkey = xmalloc(len);
 
 	if(!c->inctx)
-		c->inctx = xmalloc(sizeof(*c->inctx));
+		c->inctx = xmalloc_and_zero(sizeof(*c->inctx));
 
 	/* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
 
@@ -265,8 +258,7 @@ int metakey_h(connection_t * c)
 	if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS) {
 		bin2hex(c->inkey, buffer, len);
 		buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
-		syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Received random meta key (unencrypted): %s"),
-			   buffer);
+		syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Received random meta key (unencrypted): %s"), buffer);
 	}
 
 	/* All incoming requests will now be encrypted. */
@@ -275,10 +267,9 @@ int metakey_h(connection_t * c)
 
 	if(cipher) {
 		c->incipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(cipher);
-
+		
 		if(!c->incipher) {
-			syslog(LOG_ERR, _("%s (%s) uses unknown cipher!"), c->name,
-				   c->hostname);
+			syslog(LOG_ERR, _("%s (%s) uses unknown cipher!"), c->name, c->hostname);
 			return -1;
 		}
 
@@ -298,14 +289,12 @@ int metakey_h(connection_t * c)
 		c->indigest = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest);
 
 		if(!c->indigest) {
-			syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Node %s (%s) uses unknown digest!"), c->name,
-				   c->hostname);
+			syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Node %s (%s) uses unknown digest!"), c->name, c->hostname);
 			return -1;
 		}
 
 		if(c->inmaclength > c->indigest->md_size || c->inmaclength < 0) {
-			syslog(LOG_ERR, _("%s (%s) uses bogus MAC length!"), c->name,
-				   c->hostname);
+			syslog(LOG_ERR, _("%s (%s) uses bogus MAC length!"), c->name, c->hostname);
 			return -1;
 		}
 	} else {
@@ -319,7 +308,7 @@ int metakey_h(connection_t * c)
 	return send_challenge(c);
 }
 
-int send_challenge(connection_t * c)
+int send_challenge(connection_t *c)
 {
 	char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
 	int len, x;
@@ -351,7 +340,7 @@ int send_challenge(connection_t * c)
 	return x;
 }
 
-int challenge_h(connection_t * c)
+int challenge_h(connection_t *c)
 {
 	char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
 	int len;
@@ -390,7 +379,7 @@ int challenge_h(connection_t * c)
 	return send_chal_reply(c);
 }
 
-int send_chal_reply(connection_t * c)
+int send_chal_reply(connection_t *c)
 {
 	char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2 + 1];
 	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
@@ -414,7 +403,7 @@ int send_chal_reply(connection_t * c)
 	return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHAL_REPLY, hash);
 }
 
-int chal_reply_h(connection_t * c)
+int chal_reply_h(connection_t *c)
 {
 	char hishash[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
 	char myhash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
@@ -470,7 +459,7 @@ int chal_reply_h(connection_t * c)
 	return send_ack(c);
 }
 
-int send_ack(connection_t * c)
+int send_ack(connection_t *c)
 {
 	/* ACK message contains rest of the information the other end needs
 	   to create node_t and edge_t structures. */
@@ -492,7 +481,7 @@ int send_ack(connection_t * c)
 	return x;
 }
 
-void send_everything(connection_t * c)
+void send_everything(connection_t *c)
 {
 	avl_node_t *node, *node2;
 	node_t *n;
@@ -516,7 +505,7 @@ void send_everything(connection_t * c)
 	}
 }
 
-int ack_h(connection_t * c)
+int ack_h(connection_t *c)
 {
 	char hisport[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
 	char *hisaddress, *dummy;
@@ -548,6 +537,8 @@ int ack_h(connection_t * c)
 				syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Established a second connection with %s (%s), closing old connection"),
 					   n->name, n->hostname);
 			terminate_connection(n->connection, 0);
+			/* Run graph algorithm to purge key and make sure up/down scripts are rerun with new IP addresses and stuff */
+			graph();
 		}
 	}