X-Git-Url: https://tinc-vpn.org/git/browse?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fsptps.c;h=5088d65d388e71dfe8ab8ee347b7c40ed9ad20b1;hb=65d6f023c46ac3a087f59b60762f87c869783f21;hp=dc602e3e2154ec09e4ace56842aa93ed51531d4b;hpb=30013511504e925729ebc67772205a74c4b8aeea;p=tinc diff --git a/src/sptps.c b/src/sptps.c index dc602e3e..5088d65d 100644 --- a/src/sptps.c +++ b/src/sptps.c @@ -27,9 +27,6 @@ #include "prf.h" #include "sptps.h" -char *logfilename; -#include "utils.c" - /* Nonce MUST be exchanged first (done) Signatures MUST be done over both nonces, to guarantee the signature is fresh @@ -45,7 +42,7 @@ char *logfilename; Maybe do add some alert messages to give helpful error messages? Not more than TLS sends. - Use counter mode instead of OFB. + Use counter mode instead of OFB. (done) Make sure ECC operations are fixed time (aka prevent side-channel attacks). */ @@ -59,32 +56,31 @@ static bool error(sptps_t *s, int s_errno, const char *msg) { // Send a record (private version, accepts all record types, handles encryption and authentication). static bool send_record_priv(sptps_t *s, uint8_t type, const char *data, uint16_t len) { - char plaintext[len + 23]; - char ciphertext[len + 19]; + char buffer[len + 23UL]; // Create header with sequence number, length and record type uint32_t seqno = htonl(s->outseqno++); uint16_t netlen = htons(len); - memcpy(plaintext, &seqno, 4); - memcpy(plaintext + 4, &netlen, 2); - plaintext[6] = type; + memcpy(buffer, &seqno, 4); + memcpy(buffer + 4, &netlen, 2); + buffer[6] = type; // Add plaintext (TODO: avoid unnecessary copy) - memcpy(plaintext + 7, data, len); + memcpy(buffer + 7, data, len); if(s->outstate) { // If first handshake has finished, encrypt and HMAC - if(!digest_create(&s->outdigest, plaintext, len + 7, plaintext + 7 + len)) + if(!cipher_counter_xor(&s->outcipher, buffer + 4, len + 3UL, buffer + 4)) return false; - if(!cipher_encrypt(&s->outcipher, plaintext + 4, sizeof ciphertext, ciphertext, NULL, false)) + if(!digest_create(&s->outdigest, buffer, len + 7UL, buffer + 7UL + len)) return false; - return s->send_data(s->handle, ciphertext, len + 19); + return s->send_data(s->handle, buffer + 4, len + 19UL); } else { // Otherwise send as plaintext - return s->send_data(s->handle, plaintext + 4, len + 3); + return s->send_data(s->handle, buffer + 4, len + 3UL); } } @@ -149,8 +145,8 @@ static bool generate_key_material(sptps_t *s, const char *shared, size_t len) { // Initialise cipher and digest structures if necessary if(!s->outstate) { bool result - = cipher_open_by_name(&s->incipher, "aes-256-ofb") - && cipher_open_by_name(&s->outcipher, "aes-256-ofb") + = cipher_open_by_name(&s->incipher, "aes-256-ecb") + && cipher_open_by_name(&s->outcipher, "aes-256-ecb") && digest_open_by_name(&s->indigest, "sha256", 16) && digest_open_by_name(&s->outdigest, "sha256", 16); if(!result) @@ -191,10 +187,27 @@ static bool send_ack(sptps_t *s) { // Receive an ACKnowledgement record. static bool receive_ack(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) { if(len) - return false; + return error(s, EIO, "Invalid ACK record length"); + + if(s->initiator) { + bool result + = cipher_set_counter_key(&s->incipher, s->key) + && digest_set_key(&s->indigest, s->key + cipher_keylength(&s->incipher), digest_keylength(&s->indigest)); + if(!result) + return false; + } else { + bool result + = cipher_set_counter_key(&s->incipher, s->key + cipher_keylength(&s->outcipher) + digest_keylength(&s->outdigest)) + && digest_set_key(&s->indigest, s->key + cipher_keylength(&s->outcipher) + digest_keylength(&s->outdigest) + cipher_keylength(&s->incipher), digest_keylength(&s->indigest)); + if(!result) + return false; + } - // TODO: set cipher/digest keys - return error(s, ENOSYS, "receive_ack() not completely implemented yet"); + free(s->key); + s->key = NULL; + s->instate = true; + + return true; } // Receive a Key EXchange record, respond by sending a SIG record. @@ -244,31 +257,32 @@ static bool receive_sig(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) { if(!generate_key_material(s, shared, sizeof shared)) return false; - // Send cipher change record if necessary - //if(s->outstate && !send_ack(s)) - // return false; + free(s->mykex); + free(s->hiskex); + + s->mykex = NULL; + s->hiskex = NULL; + + // Send cipher change record + if(!send_ack(s)) + return false; // TODO: only set new keys after ACK has been set/received if(s->initiator) { bool result - = cipher_set_key(&s->incipher, s->key, false) - && digest_set_key(&s->indigest, s->key + cipher_keylength(&s->incipher), digest_keylength(&s->indigest)) - && cipher_set_key(&s->outcipher, s->key + cipher_keylength(&s->incipher) + digest_keylength(&s->indigest), true) + = cipher_set_counter_key(&s->outcipher, s->key + cipher_keylength(&s->incipher) + digest_keylength(&s->indigest)) && digest_set_key(&s->outdigest, s->key + cipher_keylength(&s->incipher) + digest_keylength(&s->indigest) + cipher_keylength(&s->outcipher), digest_keylength(&s->outdigest)); if(!result) return false; } else { bool result - = cipher_set_key(&s->outcipher, s->key, true) - && digest_set_key(&s->outdigest, s->key + cipher_keylength(&s->outcipher), digest_keylength(&s->outdigest)) - && cipher_set_key(&s->incipher, s->key + cipher_keylength(&s->outcipher) + digest_keylength(&s->outdigest), false) - && digest_set_key(&s->indigest, s->key + cipher_keylength(&s->outcipher) + digest_keylength(&s->outdigest) + cipher_keylength(&s->incipher), digest_keylength(&s->indigest)); + = cipher_set_counter_key(&s->outcipher, s->key) + && digest_set_key(&s->outdigest, s->key + cipher_keylength(&s->outcipher), digest_keylength(&s->outdigest)); if(!result) return false; } s->outstate = true; - s->instate = true; return true; } @@ -302,12 +316,13 @@ static bool receive_handshake(sptps_t *s, const char *data, uint16_t len) { if(!receive_sig(s, data, len)) return false; // s->state = SPTPS_ACK; - s->state = SPTPS_SECONDARY_KEX; + s->state = SPTPS_ACK; return true; case SPTPS_ACK: // We expect a handshake message to indicate transition to the new keys. if(!receive_ack(s, data, len)) return false; + s->receive_record(s->handle, SPTPS_HANDSHAKE, NULL, 0); s->state = SPTPS_SECONDARY_KEX; return true; // TODO: split ACK into a VERify and ACK? @@ -325,26 +340,29 @@ bool receive_data(sptps_t *s, const char *data, size_t len) { if(toread > len) toread = len; - if(s->instate) { - if(!cipher_decrypt(&s->incipher, data, toread, s->inbuf + s->buflen, NULL, false)) - return false; - } else { - memcpy(s->inbuf + s->buflen, data, toread); - } + memcpy(s->inbuf + s->buflen, data, toread); s->buflen += toread; len -= toread; data += toread; - + // Exit early if we don't have the full length. if(s->buflen < 6) return true; + // Decrypt the length bytes + + if(s->instate) { + if(!cipher_counter_xor(&s->incipher, s->inbuf + 4, 2, &s->reclen)) + return false; + } else { + memcpy(&s->reclen, s->inbuf + 4, 2); + } + + s->reclen = ntohs(s->reclen); + // If we have the length bytes, ensure our buffer can hold the whole request. - uint16_t reclen; - memcpy(&reclen, s->inbuf + 4, 2); - reclen = htons(reclen); - s->inbuf = realloc(s->inbuf, reclen + 23UL); + s->inbuf = realloc(s->inbuf, s->reclen + 23UL); if(!s->inbuf) return error(s, errno, strerror(errno)); @@ -358,41 +376,40 @@ bool receive_data(sptps_t *s, const char *data, size_t len) { } // Read up to the end of the record. - uint16_t reclen; - memcpy(&reclen, s->inbuf + 4, 2); - reclen = htons(reclen); - size_t toread = reclen + (s->instate ? 23UL : 7UL) - s->buflen; + size_t toread = s->reclen + (s->instate ? 23UL : 7UL) - s->buflen; if(toread > len) toread = len; - if(s->instate) { - if(!cipher_decrypt(&s->incipher, data, toread, s->inbuf + s->buflen, NULL, false)) - return false; - } else { - memcpy(s->inbuf + s->buflen, data, toread); - } - + memcpy(s->inbuf + s->buflen, data, toread); s->buflen += toread; len -= toread; data += toread; // If we don't have a whole record, exit. - if(s->buflen < reclen + (s->instate ? 23UL : 7UL)) + if(s->buflen < s->reclen + (s->instate ? 23UL : 7UL)) return true; - // Check HMAC. - if(s->instate) - if(!digest_verify(&s->indigest, s->inbuf, reclen + 7UL, s->inbuf + reclen + 7UL)) - error(s, EIO, "Invalid HMAC"); + // Check HMAC and decrypt. + if(s->instate) { + if(!digest_verify(&s->indigest, s->inbuf, s->reclen + 7UL, s->inbuf + s->reclen + 7UL)) + return error(s, EIO, "Invalid HMAC"); + + if(!cipher_counter_xor(&s->incipher, s->inbuf + 6UL, s->reclen + 1UL, s->inbuf + 6UL)) + return false; + } + + // Append a NULL byte for safety. + s->inbuf[s->reclen + 7UL] = 0; uint8_t type = s->inbuf[6]; - // Handle record. if(type < SPTPS_HANDSHAKE) { - if(!s->receive_record(s->handle, type, s->inbuf + 7, reclen)) + if(!s->instate) + return error(s, EIO, "Application record received before handshake finished"); + if(!s->receive_record(s->handle, type, s->inbuf + 7, s->reclen)) return false; } else if(type == SPTPS_HANDSHAKE) { - if(!receive_handshake(s, s->inbuf + 7, reclen)) + if(!receive_handshake(s, s->inbuf + 7, s->reclen)) return false; } else { return error(s, EIO, "Invalid record type");