Releasing 1.1pre2.

diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index a7bc867..679040b 100644 (file)
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -1,3 +1,16 @@
+Version 1.1pre2              Juli 17 2011
+
+ * .cookie files are renamed to .pid files, which are compatible with 1.0.x.
+
+ * Experimental protocol enhancements that can be enabled with the option
+   ExperimentalProtocol = yes:
+
+   * Ephemeral ECDH key exchange will be used for both the meta protocol and
+     UDP session keys.
+   * Key exchanges are signed with ECDSA.
+   * ECDSA public keys are automatically exchanged after RSA authentication if
+     nodes do not know each other's ECDSA public key yet.
+
 Version 1.1pre1              June 25 2011
 
  * Control interface allows control of a running tinc daemon. Used by:

diff --git a/README b/README
index 77057b0..09f6e6e 100644 (file)
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-This is the README file for tinc version 1.1pre1. Installation
+This is the README file for tinc version 1.1pre2. Installation
 instructions may be found in the INSTALL file.
 
 tinc is Copyright (C) 1998-2011 by:
@@ -29,39 +29,19 @@ protocol is not fixed yet.
 Security statement
 ------------------
 
-In August 2000, we discovered the existence of a security hole in all versions
-of tinc up to and including 1.0pre2. This had to do with the way we exchanged
-keys. Since then, we have been working on a new authentication scheme to make
-tinc as secure as possible. The current version uses the OpenSSL library and
-uses strong authentication with RSA keys.
-
-On the 29th of December 2001, Jerome Etienne posted a security analysis of tinc
-1.0pre4. Due to a lack of sequence numbers and a message authentication code
-for each packet, an attacker could possibly disrupt certain network services or
-launch a denial of service attack by replaying intercepted packets. The current
-version adds sequence numbers and message authentication codes to prevent such
-attacks.
-
-On September the 15th of 2003, Peter Gutmann contacted us and showed us a
-writeup describing various security issues in several VPN daemons. He showed
-that tinc lacks perfect forward security, the connection authentication could
-be done more properly, that the sequence number we use as an IV is not the best
-practice and that the default length of the HMAC for packets is too short in
-his opinion. We do not know of a way to exploit these weaknesses, but we will
-address these issues in tinc 2.0.
-
-Cryptography is a hard thing to get right. We cannot make any
-guarantees. Time, review and feedback are the only things that can
-prove the security of any cryptographic product. If you wish to review
-tinc or give us feedback, you are stronly encouraged to do so.
+This version uses an experimental and unfinished cryptographic protocol. Use
+it at your own risk.
 
 
 Compatibility
 -------------
 
-Version 1.1pre1 is compatible with 1.0pre8, 1.0 and later, but not with older
+Version 1.1pre2 is compatible with 1.0pre8, 1.0 and later, but not with older
 versions of tinc.
 
+When the ExperimentalProtocol option is used, tinc is still compatible with
+1.0.X and 1.1pre2 itself, but not with any other 1.1preX version.
+
 
 Requirements
 ------------

diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in
index 08cab0b..2e519b0 100644 (file)
--- a/configure.in
+++ b/configure.in
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ AC_PREREQ(2.61)
 AC_INIT
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([src/tincd.c])
 AC_GNU_SOURCE
-AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(tinc, 1.1pre1+git)
+AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(tinc, 1.1pre2)
 AC_CONFIG_HEADERS([config.h])
 AM_MAINTAINER_MODE