From: Guus Sliepen Date: Sun, 17 Jul 2011 18:09:08 +0000 (+0200) Subject: Releasing 1.1pre2. X-Git-Tag: release-1.1pre2 X-Git-Url: https://tinc-vpn.org/git/browse?a=commitdiff_plain;h=9d37ffe72282e05c109af46eb969cec542eef452;p=tinc Releasing 1.1pre2. --- diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS index a7bc8679..679040b5 100644 --- a/NEWS +++ b/NEWS @@ -1,3 +1,16 @@ +Version 1.1pre2 Juli 17 2011 + + * .cookie files are renamed to .pid files, which are compatible with 1.0.x. + + * Experimental protocol enhancements that can be enabled with the option + ExperimentalProtocol = yes: + + * Ephemeral ECDH key exchange will be used for both the meta protocol and + UDP session keys. + * Key exchanges are signed with ECDSA. + * ECDSA public keys are automatically exchanged after RSA authentication if + nodes do not know each other's ECDSA public key yet. + Version 1.1pre1 June 25 2011 * Control interface allows control of a running tinc daemon. Used by: diff --git a/README b/README index 77057b07..09f6e6e9 100644 --- a/README +++ b/README @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -This is the README file for tinc version 1.1pre1. Installation +This is the README file for tinc version 1.1pre2. Installation instructions may be found in the INSTALL file. tinc is Copyright (C) 1998-2011 by: @@ -29,39 +29,19 @@ protocol is not fixed yet. Security statement ------------------ -In August 2000, we discovered the existence of a security hole in all versions -of tinc up to and including 1.0pre2. This had to do with the way we exchanged -keys. Since then, we have been working on a new authentication scheme to make -tinc as secure as possible. The current version uses the OpenSSL library and -uses strong authentication with RSA keys. - -On the 29th of December 2001, Jerome Etienne posted a security analysis of tinc -1.0pre4. Due to a lack of sequence numbers and a message authentication code -for each packet, an attacker could possibly disrupt certain network services or -launch a denial of service attack by replaying intercepted packets. The current -version adds sequence numbers and message authentication codes to prevent such -attacks. - -On September the 15th of 2003, Peter Gutmann contacted us and showed us a -writeup describing various security issues in several VPN daemons. He showed -that tinc lacks perfect forward security, the connection authentication could -be done more properly, that the sequence number we use as an IV is not the best -practice and that the default length of the HMAC for packets is too short in -his opinion. We do not know of a way to exploit these weaknesses, but we will -address these issues in tinc 2.0. - -Cryptography is a hard thing to get right. We cannot make any -guarantees. Time, review and feedback are the only things that can -prove the security of any cryptographic product. If you wish to review -tinc or give us feedback, you are stronly encouraged to do so. +This version uses an experimental and unfinished cryptographic protocol. Use +it at your own risk. Compatibility ------------- -Version 1.1pre1 is compatible with 1.0pre8, 1.0 and later, but not with older +Version 1.1pre2 is compatible with 1.0pre8, 1.0 and later, but not with older versions of tinc. +When the ExperimentalProtocol option is used, tinc is still compatible with +1.0.X and 1.1pre2 itself, but not with any other 1.1preX version. + Requirements ------------ diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in index 08cab0ba..2e519b03 100644 --- a/configure.in +++ b/configure.in @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ AC_PREREQ(2.61) AC_INIT AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([src/tincd.c]) AC_GNU_SOURCE -AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(tinc, 1.1pre1+git) +AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(tinc, 1.1pre2) AC_CONFIG_HEADERS([config.h]) AM_MAINTAINER_MODE