From: Guus Sliepen <guus@tinc-vpn.org>
Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2011 21:43:12 +0000 (+0200)
Subject: Make use of the improved hex and base64 functions.
X-Git-Tag: release-1.1pre2~14
X-Git-Url: https://tinc-vpn.org/git/browse?a=commitdiff_plain;h=fec279a9c54ec8a13bd1ba4c7bec0d2a15454992;p=tinc
Make use of the improved hex and base64 functions.
Also, use base64 for all EC related data, it is shorter and easy to
distinguish from the legacy protocol.
---
diff --git a/src/control.c b/src/control.c
index bcafc09f..7f46a709 100644
--- a/src/control.c
+++ b/src/control.c
@@ -134,7 +134,6 @@ bool control_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
bool init_control(void) {
randomize(controlcookie, sizeof controlcookie / 2);
bin2hex(controlcookie, controlcookie, sizeof controlcookie / 2);
- controlcookie[sizeof controlcookie - 1] = 0;
FILE *f = fopen(pidfilename, "w");
if(!f) {
diff --git a/src/protocol_auth.c b/src/protocol_auth.c
index 21a4b7e1..41911e42 100644
--- a/src/protocol_auth.c
+++ b/src/protocol_auth.c
@@ -143,24 +143,19 @@ bool send_metakey_ec(connection_t *c) {
size_t siglen = ecdsa_size(&myself->connection->ecdsa);
- char key[ECDH_SIZE];
- char sig[siglen];
+ char key[(ECDH_SIZE + siglen) * 2 + 1];
// TODO: include nonce? Use relevant parts of SSH or TLS protocol
if(!ecdh_generate_public(&c->ecdh, key))
return false;
- if(!ecdsa_sign(&myself->connection->ecdsa, key, ECDH_SIZE, sig))
+ if(!ecdsa_sign(&myself->connection->ecdsa, key, ECDH_SIZE, key + ECDH_SIZE))
return false;
- char out[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
-
- bin2hex(key, out, ECDH_SIZE);
- bin2hex(sig, out + ECDH_SIZE * 2, siglen);
- out[(ECDH_SIZE + siglen) * 2] = 0;
+ b64encode(key, key, ECDH_SIZE + siglen);
- bool result = send_request(c, "%d %s", METAKEY, out);
+ bool result = send_request(c, "%d %s", METAKEY, key);
}
bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
@@ -198,7 +193,6 @@ bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
ifdebug(SCARY_THINGS) {
bin2hex(key, hexkey, len);
- hexkey[len * 2] = '\0';
logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Generated random meta key (unencrypted): %s", hexkey);
}
@@ -217,7 +211,6 @@ bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
/* Convert the encrypted random data to a hexadecimal formatted string */
bin2hex(enckey, hexkey, len);
- hexkey[len * 2] = '\0';
/* Send the meta key */
@@ -232,31 +225,29 @@ bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
static bool metakey_ec_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
size_t siglen = ecdsa_size(&c->ecdsa);
- char in[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
char key[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
char sig[siglen];
logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Got ECDH metakey from %s", c->name);
- if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, in) != 1) {
+ if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, key) != 1) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "METAKEY", c->name, c->hostname);
return false;
}
- if(strlen(in) != (ECDH_SIZE + siglen) * 2) {
- logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s %d != %d", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong keylength", strlen(in) / 2, (ECDH_SIZE + siglen));
+ int inlen = b64decode(key, key, sizeof key);
+
+ if(inlen != (ECDH_SIZE + siglen)) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong keylength");
return false;
}
- hex2bin(in, key, ECDH_SIZE);
- hex2bin(in + ECDH_SIZE * 2, sig, siglen);
-
- if(!ecdsa_verify(&c->ecdsa, key, ECDH_SIZE, sig)) {
+ if(!ecdsa_verify(&c->ecdsa, key, ECDH_SIZE, key + ECDH_SIZE)) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "invalid ECDSA signature");
return false;
}
- char shared[ECDH_SHARED_SIZE * 2 + 1];
+ char shared[ECDH_SHARED_SIZE];
if(!ecdh_compute_shared(&c->ecdh, key, shared))
return false;
@@ -294,10 +285,6 @@ static bool metakey_ec_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
free(seed);
- bin2hex(shared, shared, ECDH_SHARED_SIZE);
- shared[ECDH_SHARED_SIZE * 2] = 0;
- logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Shared secret is %s", shared);
-
cipher_set_key(&c->incipher, mykey, true);
digest_set_key(&c->indigest, mykey + mykeylen, mykeylen);
@@ -326,17 +313,17 @@ bool metakey_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
return false;
}
+ /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
+
+ int inlen = hex2bin(hexkey, enckey, sizeof enckey);
+
/* Check if the length of the meta key is all right */
- if(strlen(hexkey) != len * 2) {
+ if(inlen != len) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong keylength");
return false;
}
- /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
-
- hex2bin(hexkey, enckey, len);
-
/* Decrypt the meta key */
if(!rsa_private_decrypt(&myself->connection->rsa, enckey, len, key)) {
@@ -346,7 +333,6 @@ bool metakey_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
ifdebug(SCARY_THINGS) {
bin2hex(key, hexkey, len);
- hexkey[len * 2] = '\0';
logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Received random meta key (unencrypted): %s", hexkey);
}
@@ -383,7 +369,6 @@ bool send_challenge(connection_t *c) {
/* Convert to hex */
bin2hex(c->hischallenge, buffer, len);
- buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
/* Send the challenge */
@@ -401,17 +386,17 @@ bool challenge_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
return false;
}
+ /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
+
+ int inlen = hex2bin(buffer, buffer, sizeof buffer);
+
/* Check if the length of the challenge is all right */
- if(strlen(buffer) != len * 2) {
+ if(inlen != len) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge length");
return false;
}
- /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
-
- hex2bin(buffer, buffer, len);
-
c->allow_request = CHAL_REPLY;
/* Calculate the hash from the challenge we received */
@@ -421,7 +406,6 @@ bool challenge_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
/* Convert the hash to a hexadecimal formatted string */
bin2hex(digest, buffer, digestlen);
- buffer[digestlen * 2] = '\0';
/* Send the reply */
@@ -437,16 +421,17 @@ bool chal_reply_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
return false;
}
+ /* Convert the hash to binary format */
+
+ int inlen = hex2bin(hishash, hishash, sizeof hishash);
+
/* Check if the length of the hash is all right */
- if(strlen(hishash) != digest_length(&c->outdigest) * 2) {
+ if(inlen != digest_length(&c->outdigest)) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply length");
return false;
}
- /* Convert the hash to binary format */
-
- hex2bin(hishash, hishash, digest_length(&c->outdigest));
/* Verify the hash */
diff --git a/src/protocol_key.c b/src/protocol_key.c
index 0ae95681..fc3707ae 100644
--- a/src/protocol_key.c
+++ b/src/protocol_key.c
@@ -149,8 +149,7 @@ bool send_ans_key_ecdh(node_t *to) {
ecdh_generate_public(&to->ecdh, key);
- bin2hex(key, key, ECDH_SIZE);
- key[ECDH_SIZE * 2] = '\0';
+ b64encode(key, key, ECDH_SIZE);
return send_request(to->nexthop->connection, "%d %s %s ECDH:%s %d %d %zu %d", ANS_KEY,
myself->name, to->name, key,
@@ -176,7 +175,6 @@ bool send_ans_key(node_t *to) {
digest_set_key(&to->indigest, key, keylen);
bin2hex(key, key, keylen);
- key[keylen * 2] = '\0';
// Reset sequence number and late packet window
mykeyused = true;
@@ -281,7 +279,7 @@ bool ans_key_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
/* ECDH or old-style key exchange? */
if(experimental && !strncmp(key, "ECDH:", 5)) {
- keylen = (strlen(key) - 5) / 2;
+ int keylen = b64decode(key + 5, key + 5, sizeof key - 5);
if(keylen != ECDH_SIZE) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Node %s (%s) uses wrong keylength!", from->name, from->hostname);
@@ -300,8 +298,6 @@ bool ans_key_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
}
char shared[ECDH_SHARED_SIZE * 2 + 1];
- char hex[ECDH_SHARED_SIZE * 2 + 1];
- hex2bin(key + 5, key + 5, keylen);
if(!ecdh_compute_shared(&from->ecdh, key + 5, shared))
return false;
@@ -349,8 +345,7 @@ bool ans_key_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
if(strcmp(myself->name, from->name) < 0)
memmove(key, key + mykeylen * 2, hiskeylen * 2);
} else {
- keylen = strlen(key) / 2;
- hex2bin(key, key, keylen);
+ keylen = hex2bin(key, key, sizeof key);
if(keylen != cipher_keylength(&from->outcipher)) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Node %s (%s) uses wrong keylength!", from->name, from->hostname);