Add stricter checks for netnames.

[tinc] / src / protocol_auth.c

diff --git a/src/protocol_auth.c b/src/protocol_auth.c
index cd39f28..0a7ad1c 100644 (file)
--- a/src/protocol_auth.c
+++ b/src/protocol_auth.c
@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@
 #include "utils.h"
 #include "xalloc.h"
 
+#include "ed25519/sha512.h"
+
 ecdsa_t *invitation_key = NULL;
 
 static bool send_proxyrequest(connection_t *c) {
@@ -115,7 +117,7 @@ static bool send_proxyrequest(connection_t *c) {
                                i += 2;
                                c->tcplen += 22;
                        } else {
-                               logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Address family %hx not supported for SOCKS 5 proxies!", c->address.sa.sa_family);
+                               logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Address family %x not supported for SOCKS 5 proxies!", c->address.sa.sa_family);
                                return false;
                        }
                        if(i > len)
@@ -211,17 +213,13 @@ static bool receive_invitation_sptps(void *handle, uint8_t type, const void *dat
                return false;
 
        // Recover the filename from the cookie and the key
-       digest_t *digest = digest_open_by_name("sha256", 18);
-       if(!digest)
-               abort();
        char *fingerprint = ecdsa_get_base64_public_key(invitation_key);
        char hashbuf[18 + strlen(fingerprint)];
-       char cookie[25];
+       char cookie[64];
        memcpy(hashbuf, data, 18);
        memcpy(hashbuf + 18, fingerprint, sizeof hashbuf - 18);
-       digest_create(digest, hashbuf, sizeof hashbuf, cookie);
+       sha512(hashbuf, sizeof hashbuf, cookie);
        b64encode_urlsafe(cookie, cookie, 18);
-       digest_close(digest);
        free(fingerprint);
 
        char filename[PATH_MAX], usedname[PATH_MAX];
@@ -388,7 +386,7 @@ bool id_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
 
        /* Forbid version rollback for nodes whose Ed25519 key we know */
 
-       if(ecdsa_active(c->ecdsa) && c->protocol_minor < 2) {
+       if(ecdsa_active(c->ecdsa) && c->protocol_minor < 1) {
                logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_ERR, "Peer %s (%s) tries to roll back protocol version to %d.%d",
                        c->name, c->hostname, c->protocol_major, c->protocol_minor);
                return false;
@@ -412,6 +410,9 @@ bool id_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
 }
 
 bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
+#ifdef DISABLE_LEGACY
+       return false;
+#else
        if(!myself->connection->rsa) {
                logger(DEBUG_CONNECTIONS, LOG_ERR, "Peer %s (%s) uses legacy protocol which we don't support", c->name, c->hostname);
                return false;
@@ -480,9 +481,13 @@ bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
 
        c->status.encryptout = true;
        return result;
+#endif
 }
 
 bool metakey_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
+#ifdef DISABLE_LEGACY
+       return false;
+#else
        if(!myself->connection->rsa)
                return false;
 
@@ -545,9 +550,13 @@ bool metakey_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
        c->allow_request = CHALLENGE;
 
        return send_challenge(c);
+#endif
 }
 
 bool send_challenge(connection_t *c) {
+#ifdef DISABLE_LEGACY
+       return false;
+#else
        const size_t len = rsa_size(c->rsa);
        char buffer[len * 2 + 1];
 
@@ -565,9 +574,13 @@ bool send_challenge(connection_t *c) {
        /* Send the challenge */
 
        return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHALLENGE, buffer);
+#endif
 }
 
 bool challenge_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
+#ifdef DISABLE_LEGACY
+       return false;
+#else
        if(!myself->connection->rsa)
                return false;
 
@@ -606,9 +619,13 @@ bool challenge_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
        c->allow_request = CHAL_REPLY;
 
        return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHAL_REPLY, buffer);
+#endif
 }
 
 bool chal_reply_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
+#ifdef DISABLE_LEGACY
+       return false;
+#else
        char hishash[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
 
        if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, hishash) != 1) {
@@ -645,9 +662,13 @@ bool chal_reply_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
        c->allow_request = ACK;
 
        return send_ack(c);
+#endif
 }
 
 static bool send_upgrade(connection_t *c) {
+#ifdef DISABLE_LEGACY
+       return false;
+#else
        /* Special case when protocol_minor is 1: the other end is Ed25519 capable,
         * but doesn't know our key yet. So send it now. */
 
@@ -659,6 +680,7 @@ static bool send_upgrade(connection_t *c) {
        bool result = send_request(c, "%d %s", ACK, pubkey);
        free(pubkey);
        return result;
+#endif
 }
 
 bool send_ack(connection_t *c) {
@@ -758,6 +780,8 @@ static bool upgrade_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
        logger(DEBUG_ALWAYS, LOG_INFO, "Got Ed25519 public key from %s (%s), upgrading!", c->name, c->hostname);
        append_config_file(c->name, "Ed25519PublicKey", pubkey);
        c->allow_request = TERMREQ;
+       if(c->outgoing)
+               c->outgoing->timeout = 0;
        return send_termreq(c);
 }