- Fix indentation in some places.

[tinc] / src / protocol_auth.c

diff --git a/src/protocol_auth.c b/src/protocol_auth.c
index da2fa13..134e0f0 100644 (file)
--- a/src/protocol_auth.c
+++ b/src/protocol_auth.c
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
     along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
     Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
 
-    $Id: protocol_auth.c,v 1.1.4.18 2003/01/12 17:02:23 guus Exp $
+    $Id: protocol_auth.c,v 1.1.4.19 2003/01/17 00:37:20 guus Exp $
 */
 
 #include "config.h"
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ int send_metakey(connection_t *c)
                c->outkey = xmalloc(len);
 
        if(!c->outctx)
-               c->outctx = xmalloc(sizeof(*c->outctx));
+               c->outctx = xmalloc_and_zero(sizeof(*c->outctx));
        cp();
        /* Copy random data to the buffer */
 
@@ -224,9 +224,7 @@ int metakey_h(connection_t *c)
 
        cp();
 
-       if(sscanf
-          (c->buffer, "%*d %d %d %d %d " MAX_STRING, &cipher, &digest, &maclength,
-               &compression, buffer) != 5) {
+       if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d %d %d %d %d " MAX_STRING, &cipher, &digest, &maclength, &compression, buffer) != 5) {
                syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "METAKEY", c->name,
                           c->hostname);
                return -1;
@@ -237,8 +235,7 @@ int metakey_h(connection_t *c)
        /* Check if the length of the meta key is all right */
 
        if(strlen(buffer) != len * 2) {
-               syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name,
-                          c->hostname, "wrong keylength");
+               syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name, c->hostname, "wrong keylength");
                return -1;
        }
 
@@ -248,7 +245,7 @@ int metakey_h(connection_t *c)
                c->inkey = xmalloc(len);
 
        if(!c->inctx)
-               c->inctx = xmalloc(sizeof(*c->inctx));
+               c->inctx = xmalloc_and_zero(sizeof(*c->inctx));
 
        /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
 
@@ -265,8 +262,7 @@ int metakey_h(connection_t *c)
        if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS) {
                bin2hex(c->inkey, buffer, len);
                buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
-               syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Received random meta key (unencrypted): %s"),
-                          buffer);
+               syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Received random meta key (unencrypted): %s"), buffer);
        }
 
        /* All incoming requests will now be encrypted. */
@@ -275,10 +271,9 @@ int metakey_h(connection_t *c)
 
        if(cipher) {
                c->incipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(cipher);
-
+               
                if(!c->incipher) {
-                       syslog(LOG_ERR, _("%s (%s) uses unknown cipher!"), c->name,
-                                  c->hostname);
+                       syslog(LOG_ERR, _("%s (%s) uses unknown cipher!"), c->name, c->hostname);
                        return -1;
                }
 
@@ -298,14 +293,12 @@ int metakey_h(connection_t *c)
                c->indigest = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest);
 
                if(!c->indigest) {
-                       syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Node %s (%s) uses unknown digest!"), c->name,
-                                  c->hostname);
+                       syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Node %s (%s) uses unknown digest!"), c->name, c->hostname);
                        return -1;
                }
 
                if(c->inmaclength > c->indigest->md_size || c->inmaclength < 0) {
-                       syslog(LOG_ERR, _("%s (%s) uses bogus MAC length!"), c->name,
-                                  c->hostname);
+                       syslog(LOG_ERR, _("%s (%s) uses bogus MAC length!"), c->name, c->hostname);
                        return -1;
                }
        } else {