#include "edge.h"
#include "graph.h"
#include "logger.h"
+#include "meta.h"
#include "net.h"
#include "netutl.h"
#include "node.h"
#include "prf.h"
#include "protocol.h"
#include "rsa.h"
+#include "sptps.h"
#include "utils.h"
#include "xalloc.h"
return false;
}
- if(experimental && c->protocol_minor >= 2)
+ if(experimental && c->protocol_minor >= 2) {
if(!read_ecdsa_public_key(c))
return false;
+ }
} else {
if(c->protocol_minor && !ecdsa_active(&c->ecdsa))
c->protocol_minor = 1;
c->allow_request = METAKEY;
- if(c->protocol_minor >= 2)
- return send_metakey_ec(c);
- else
- return send_metakey(c);
-}
-
-bool send_metakey_ec(connection_t *c) {
- logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Sending ECDH metakey to %s", c->name);
-
- size_t siglen = ecdsa_size(&myself->connection->ecdsa);
-
- char key[(ECDH_SIZE + siglen) * 2 + 1];
-
- // TODO: include nonce? Use relevant parts of SSH or TLS protocol
-
- if(!ecdh_generate_public(&c->ecdh, key))
- return false;
+ if(c->protocol_minor >= 2) {
+ c->allow_request = ACK;
+ char label[25 + strlen(myself->name) + strlen(c->name)];
- if(!ecdsa_sign(&myself->connection->ecdsa, key, ECDH_SIZE, key + ECDH_SIZE))
- return false;
+ if(c->outgoing)
+ snprintf(label, sizeof label, "tinc TCP key expansion %s %s", myself->name, c->name);
+ else
+ snprintf(label, sizeof label, "tinc TCP key expansion %s %s", c->name, myself->name);
- b64encode(key, key, ECDH_SIZE + siglen);
-
- return send_request(c, "%d %s", METAKEY, key);
+ return start_sptps(&c->sptps, c, c->outgoing, myself->connection->ecdsa, c->ecdsa, label, sizeof label, send_meta_sptps, receive_meta_sptps);
+ } else {
+ return send_metakey(c);
+ }
}
bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
return result;
}
-static bool metakey_ec_h(connection_t *c, const char *request) {
- size_t siglen = ecdsa_size(&c->ecdsa);
- char key[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
-
- logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Got ECDH metakey from %s", c->name);
-
- if(sscanf(request, "%*d " MAX_STRING, key) != 1) {
- logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "METAKEY", c->name, c->hostname);
- return false;
- }
-
- int inlen = b64decode(key, key, sizeof key);
-
- if(inlen != (ECDH_SIZE + siglen)) {
- logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong keylength");
- return false;
- }
-
- if(!ecdsa_verify(&c->ecdsa, key, ECDH_SIZE, key + ECDH_SIZE)) {
- logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "invalid ECDSA signature");
- return false;
- }
-
- char shared[ECDH_SHARED_SIZE];
-
- if(!ecdh_compute_shared(&c->ecdh, key, shared))
- return false;
-
- /* Update our crypto end */
-
- if(!cipher_open_by_name(&c->incipher, "aes-256-ofb"))
- return false;
- if(!digest_open_by_name(&c->indigest, "sha512", -1))
- return false;
- if(!cipher_open_by_name(&c->outcipher, "aes-256-ofb"))
- return false;
- if(!digest_open_by_name(&c->outdigest, "sha512", -1))
- return false;
-
- size_t mykeylen = cipher_keylength(&c->incipher);
- size_t hiskeylen = cipher_keylength(&c->outcipher);
-
- char *mykey;
- char *hiskey;
- char *seed;
-
- if(strcmp(myself->name, c->name) < 0) {
- mykey = key;
- hiskey = key + mykeylen * 2;
- xasprintf(&seed, "tinc TCP key expansion %s %s", myself->name, c->name);
- } else {
- mykey = key + hiskeylen * 2;
- hiskey = key;
- xasprintf(&seed, "tinc TCP key expansion %s %s", c->name, myself->name);
- }
-
- if(!prf(shared, ECDH_SHARED_SIZE, seed, strlen(seed), key, hiskeylen * 2 + mykeylen * 2))
- return false;
-
- free(seed);
-
- cipher_set_key(&c->incipher, mykey, false);
- digest_set_key(&c->indigest, mykey + mykeylen, mykeylen);
-
- cipher_set_key(&c->outcipher, hiskey, true);
- digest_set_key(&c->outdigest, hiskey + hiskeylen, hiskeylen);
-
- c->status.decryptin = true;
- c->status.encryptout = true;
- c->allow_request = CHALLENGE;
-
- return send_challenge(c);
-}
-
bool metakey_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
- if(c->protocol_minor >= 2)
- return metakey_ec_h(c, request);
-
char hexkey[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
int cipher, digest, maclength, compression;
size_t len = rsa_size(&myself->connection->rsa);
}
bool send_challenge(connection_t *c) {
- size_t len = c->protocol_minor >= 2 ? ECDH_SIZE : rsa_size(&c->rsa);
+ size_t len = rsa_size(&c->rsa);
char buffer[len * 2 + 1];
if(!c->hischallenge)
bool challenge_h(connection_t *c, char *request) {
char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
- size_t len = c->protocol_minor >= 2 ? ECDH_SIZE : rsa_size(&myself->connection->rsa);
+ size_t len = rsa_size(&myself->connection->rsa);
size_t digestlen = digest_length(&c->indigest);
char digest[digestlen];
/* Verify the hash */
- if(!digest_verify(&c->outdigest, c->hischallenge, c->protocol_minor >= 2 ? ECDH_SIZE : rsa_size(&c->rsa), hishash)) {
+ if(!digest_verify(&c->outdigest, c->hischallenge, rsa_size(&c->rsa), hishash)) {
logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply");
return false;
}
projects / tinc / blobdiff