/*
protocol_auth.c -- handle the meta-protocol, authentication
- Copyright (C) 1999-2002 Ivo Timmermans <itimmermans@bigfoot.com>,
- 2000-2002 Guus Sliepen <guus@sliepen.warande.net>
+ Copyright (C) 1999-2005 Ivo Timmermans,
+ 2000-2015 Guus Sliepen <guus@tinc-vpn.org>
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
- You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
- Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
-
- $Id: protocol_auth.c,v 1.1.4.6 2002/03/23 20:01:05 guus Exp $
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
+ with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
+ 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
*/
-#include "config.h"
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <syslog.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-
-#include <utils.h>
-#include <xalloc.h>
-#include <avl_tree.h>
+#include "system.h"
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#ifndef HAVE_RAND_PSEUDO_BYTES
-#define RAND_pseudo_bytes RAND_bytes
-#endif
-
+#include "avl_tree.h"
#include "conf.h"
-#include "net.h"
-#include "netutl.h"
-#include "protocol.h"
-#include "meta.h"
#include "connection.h"
-#include "node.h"
#include "edge.h"
#include "graph.h"
+#include "logger.h"
+#include "meta.h"
+#include "net.h"
+#include "netutl.h"
+#include "node.h"
+#include "protocol.h"
+#include "proxy.h"
+#include "utils.h"
+#include "xalloc.h"
-#include "system.h"
+bool send_id(connection_t *c) {
+ if(proxytype && c->outgoing)
+ if(!send_proxyrequest(c))
+ return false;
-int send_id(connection_t *c)
-{
-cp
- return send_request(c, "%d %s %d", ID, myself->connection->name, myself->connection->protocol_version);
+ return send_request(c, "%d %s %d", ID, myself->connection->name,
+ myself->connection->protocol_version);
}
-int id_h(connection_t *c)
-{
- char name[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
- int bla;
-cp
- if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d "MAX_STRING" %d", name, &c->protocol_version) != 2)
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "ID", c->name, c->hostname);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Check if identity is a valid name */
-
- if(check_id(name))
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s): %s"), "ID", c->name, c->hostname, "invalid name");
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* If we set c->name in advance, make sure we are connected to the right host */
-
- if(c->name)
- {
- if(strcmp(c->name, name))
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Peer %s is %s instead of %s"), c->hostname, name, c->name);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- else
- c->name = xstrdup(name);
-
- /* Check if version matches */
-
- if(c->protocol_version != myself->connection->protocol_version)
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Peer %s (%s) uses incompatible version %d"),
- c->name, c->hostname, c->protocol_version);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if(bypass_security)
- {
- if(!c->config_tree)
- init_configuration(&c->config_tree);
- c->allow_request = ACK;
- return send_ack(c);
- }
-
- if(!c->config_tree)
- {
- init_configuration(&c->config_tree);
-
- if((bla = read_connection_config(c)))
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Peer %s had unknown identity (%s)"), c->hostname, c->name);
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- if(read_rsa_public_key(c))
- {
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Check some options */
-
- if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "IndirectData"), &bla) && bla) || myself->options & OPTION_INDIRECT)
- c->options |= OPTION_INDIRECT;
-
- if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "TCPOnly"), &bla) && bla) || myself->options & OPTION_TCPONLY)
- c->options |= OPTION_TCPONLY | OPTION_INDIRECT;
-
- c->allow_request = METAKEY;
-cp
- return send_metakey(c);
+bool id_h(connection_t *c) {
+ char name[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
+
+ if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d", name, &c->protocol_version) != 2) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "ID", c->name,
+ c->hostname);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if identity is a valid name */
+
+ if(!check_id(name)) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s): %s", "ID", c->name,
+ c->hostname, "invalid name");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /* If this is an outgoing connection, make sure we are connected to the right host */
+
+ if(c->outgoing) {
+ if(strcmp(c->name, name)) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Peer %s is %s instead of %s", c->hostname, name,
+ c->name);
+ return false;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if(c->name)
+ free(c->name);
+ c->name = xstrdup(name);
+ }
+
+ /* Check if version matches */
+
+ if(c->protocol_version != myself->connection->protocol_version) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Peer %s (%s) uses incompatible version %d",
+ c->name, c->hostname, c->protocol_version);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if(bypass_security) {
+ if(!c->config_tree)
+ init_configuration(&c->config_tree);
+ c->allow_request = ACK;
+ return send_ack(c);
+ }
+
+ if(!c->config_tree) {
+ init_configuration(&c->config_tree);
+
+ if(!read_connection_config(c)) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Peer %s had unknown identity (%s)", c->hostname,
+ c->name);
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(!read_rsa_public_key(c)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ c->allow_request = METAKEY;
+
+ return send_metakey(c);
}
-int send_metakey(connection_t *c)
-{
- char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
- int len, x;
-cp
- len = RSA_size(c->rsa_key);
-
- /* Allocate buffers for the meta key */
-
- if(!c->outkey)
- c->outkey = xmalloc(len);
-
- if(!c->outctx)
- c->outctx = xmalloc(sizeof(*c->outctx));
-cp
- /* Copy random data to the buffer */
-
- RAND_bytes(c->outkey, len);
-
- /* The message we send must be smaller than the modulus of the RSA key.
- By definition, for a key of k bits, the following formula holds:
-
- 2^(k-1) <= modulus < 2^(k)
-
- Where ^ means "to the power of", not "xor".
- This means that to be sure, we must choose our message < 2^(k-1).
- This can be done by setting the most significant bit to zero.
- */
-
- c->outkey[0] &= 0x7F;
-
- if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS)
- {
- bin2hex(c->outkey, buffer, len);
- buffer[len*2] = '\0';
- syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Generated random meta key (unencrypted): %s"), buffer);
- }
-
- /* Encrypt the random data
-
- We do not use one of the PKCS padding schemes here.
- This is allowed, because we encrypt a totally random string
- with a length equal to that of the modulus of the RSA key.
- */
-
- if(RSA_public_encrypt(len, c->outkey, buffer, c->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len)
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)"), c->name, c->hostname);
- return -1;
- }
-cp
- /* Convert the encrypted random data to a hexadecimal formatted string */
-
- bin2hex(buffer, buffer, len);
- buffer[len*2] = '\0';
-
- /* Send the meta key */
-
- x = send_request(c, "%d %d %d %d %d %s", METAKEY,
- c->outcipher?c->outcipher->nid:0, c->outdigest?c->outdigest->type:0,
- c->outmaclength, c->outcompression, buffer);
-
- /* Further outgoing requests are encrypted with the key we just generated */
-
- if(c->outcipher)
- {
- EVP_EncryptInit(c->outctx, c->outcipher,
- c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len,
- c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len - c->outcipher->iv_len);
-
- c->status.encryptout = 1;
- }
-cp
- return x;
+bool send_metakey(connection_t *c) {
+ bool x;
+
+ int len = RSA_size(c->rsa_key);
+
+ /* Allocate buffers for the meta key */
+
+ char buffer[2 * len + 1];
+
+ c->outkey = xrealloc(c->outkey, len);
+
+ if(!c->outctx)
+ c->outctx = xmalloc_and_zero(sizeof(*c->outctx));
+
+ /* Copy random data to the buffer */
+
+ if (1 != RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)c->outkey, len)) {
+ int err = ERR_get_error();
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Failed to generate meta key (%s)", ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+
+ /* The message we send must be smaller than the modulus of the RSA key.
+ By definition, for a key of k bits, the following formula holds:
+
+ 2^(k-1) <= modulus < 2^(k)
+
+ Where ^ means "to the power of", not "xor".
+ This means that to be sure, we must choose our message < 2^(k-1).
+ This can be done by setting the most significant bit to zero.
+ */
+
+ c->outkey[0] &= 0x7F;
+
+ ifdebug(SCARY_THINGS) {
+ bin2hex(c->outkey, buffer, len);
+ buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
+ logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Generated random meta key (unencrypted): %s",
+ buffer);
+ }
+
+ /* Encrypt the random data
+
+ We do not use one of the PKCS padding schemes here.
+ This is allowed, because we encrypt a totally random string
+ with a length equal to that of the modulus of the RSA key.
+ */
+
+ if(RSA_public_encrypt(len, (unsigned char *)c->outkey, (unsigned char *)buffer, c->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s): %s",
+ c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /* Convert the encrypted random data to a hexadecimal formatted string */
+
+ bin2hex(buffer, buffer, len);
+ buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
+
+ /* Send the meta key */
+
+ x = send_request(c, "%d %d %d %d %d %s", METAKEY,
+ c->outcipher ? c->outcipher->nid : 0,
+ c->outdigest ? c->outdigest->type : 0, c->outmaclength,
+ c->outcompression, buffer);
+
+ /* Further outgoing requests are encrypted with the key we just generated */
+
+ if(c->outcipher) {
+ if(!EVP_EncryptInit(c->outctx, c->outcipher,
+ (unsigned char *)c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len,
+ (unsigned char *)c->outkey + len - c->outcipher->key_len -
+ c->outcipher->iv_len)) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during initialisation of cipher for %s (%s): %s",
+ c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ c->status.encryptout = true;
+ }
+
+ return x;
}
-int metakey_h(connection_t *c)
-{
- char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
- int cipher, digest, maclength, compression;
- int len;
-cp
- if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d %d %d %d %d "MAX_STRING, &cipher, &digest, &maclength, &compression, buffer) != 5)
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "METAKEY", c->name, c->hostname);
- return -1;
- }
-cp
- len = RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key);
-
- /* Check if the length of the meta key is all right */
-
- if(strlen(buffer) != len*2)
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name, c->hostname, "wrong keylength");
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Allocate buffers for the meta key */
-cp
- if(!c->inkey)
- c->inkey = xmalloc(len);
-
- if(!c->inctx)
- c->inctx = xmalloc(sizeof(*c->inctx));
-
- /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
-cp
- hex2bin(buffer,buffer,len);
-
- /* Decrypt the meta key */
-cp
- if(RSA_private_decrypt(len, buffer, c->inkey, myself->connection->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) /* See challenge() */
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Error during encryption of meta key for %s (%s)"), c->name, c->hostname);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS)
- {
- bin2hex(c->inkey, buffer, len);
- buffer[len*2] = '\0';
- syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Received random meta key (unencrypted): %s"), buffer);
- }
-
- /* All incoming requests will now be encrypted. */
-cp
- /* Check and lookup cipher and digest algorithms */
-
- if(cipher)
- {
- c->incipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(cipher);
- if(!c->incipher)
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("%s (%s) uses unknown cipher!"), c->name, c->hostname);
- return -1;
- }
-
- EVP_DecryptInit(c->inctx, c->incipher,
- c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len,
- c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len - c->incipher->iv_len);
-
- c->status.decryptin = 1;
- }
- else
- {
- c->incipher = NULL;
- }
-
- c->inmaclength = maclength;
-
- if(digest)
- {
- c->indigest = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest);
- if(!c->indigest)
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Node %s (%s) uses unknown digest!"), c->name, c->hostname);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if(c->inmaclength > c->indigest->md_size || c->inmaclength < 0)
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("%s (%s) uses bogus MAC length!"), c->name, c->hostname);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- else
- {
- c->indigest = NULL;
- }
-
- c->incompression = compression;
-
- c->allow_request = CHALLENGE;
-cp
- return send_challenge(c);
+bool metakey_h(connection_t *c) {
+ char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
+ int cipher, digest, maclength, compression;
+ int len;
+
+ if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d %d %d %d %d " MAX_STRING, &cipher, &digest, &maclength, &compression, buffer) != 5) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "METAKEY", c->name,
+ c->hostname);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ len = RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key);
+
+ /* Check if the length of the meta key is all right */
+
+ if(strlen(buffer) != len * 2) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name, c->hostname, "wrong keylength");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate buffers for the meta key */
+
+ c->inkey = xrealloc(c->inkey, len);
+
+ if(!c->inctx)
+ c->inctx = xmalloc_and_zero(sizeof(*c->inctx));
+
+ /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
+
+ if(!hex2bin(buffer, buffer, len)) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s(%s): %s", "METAKEY", c->name, c->hostname, "invalid key");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /* Decrypt the meta key */
+
+ if(RSA_private_decrypt(len, (unsigned char *)buffer, (unsigned char *)c->inkey, myself->connection->rsa_key, RSA_NO_PADDING) != len) { /* See challenge() */
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during decryption of meta key for %s (%s): %s",
+ c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ ifdebug(SCARY_THINGS) {
+ bin2hex(c->inkey, buffer, len);
+ buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
+ logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Received random meta key (unencrypted): %s", buffer);
+ }
+
+ /* All incoming requests will now be encrypted. */
+
+ /* Check and lookup cipher and digest algorithms */
+
+ if(cipher) {
+ c->incipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(cipher);
+
+ if(!c->incipher) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "%s (%s) uses unknown cipher!", c->name, c->hostname);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if(!EVP_DecryptInit(c->inctx, c->incipher,
+ (unsigned char *)c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len,
+ (unsigned char *)c->inkey + len - c->incipher->key_len -
+ c->incipher->iv_len)) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during initialisation of cipher from %s (%s): %s",
+ c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ c->status.decryptin = true;
+ } else {
+ c->incipher = NULL;
+ }
+
+ c->inmaclength = maclength;
+
+ if(digest) {
+ c->indigest = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest);
+
+ if(!c->indigest) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Node %s (%s) uses unknown digest!", c->name, c->hostname);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if(c->inmaclength > c->indigest->md_size || c->inmaclength < 0) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "%s (%s) uses bogus MAC length!", c->name, c->hostname);
+ return false;
+ }
+ } else {
+ c->indigest = NULL;
+ }
+
+ c->incompression = compression;
+
+ c->allow_request = CHALLENGE;
+
+ return send_challenge(c);
}
-int send_challenge(connection_t *c)
-{
- char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
- int len, x;
-cp
- /* CHECKME: what is most reasonable value for len? */
+bool send_challenge(connection_t *c) {
+ /* CHECKME: what is most reasonable value for len? */
- len = RSA_size(c->rsa_key);
+ int len = RSA_size(c->rsa_key);
- /* Allocate buffers for the challenge */
+ /* Allocate buffers for the challenge */
- if(!c->hischallenge)
- c->hischallenge = xmalloc(len);
-cp
- /* Copy random data to the buffer */
+ char buffer[2 * len + 1];
- RAND_bytes(c->hischallenge, len);
+ c->hischallenge = xrealloc(c->hischallenge, len);
-cp
- /* Convert to hex */
+ /* Copy random data to the buffer */
- bin2hex(c->hischallenge, buffer, len);
- buffer[len*2] = '\0';
+ if (1 != RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)c->hischallenge, len)) {
+ int err = ERR_get_error();
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Failed to generate challenge (%s)", ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
+ return false; // Do not send predictable challenges, let connection attempt fail.
+ }
+
+ /* Convert to hex */
+
+ bin2hex(c->hischallenge, buffer, len);
+ buffer[len * 2] = '\0';
-cp
- /* Send the challenge */
+ /* Send the challenge */
- x = send_request(c, "%d %s", CHALLENGE, buffer);
-cp
- return x;
+ return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHALLENGE, buffer);
}
-int challenge_h(connection_t *c)
-{
- char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
- int len;
-cp
- if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d "MAX_STRING, buffer) != 1)
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "CHALLENGE", c->name, c->hostname);
- return -1;
- }
+bool challenge_h(connection_t *c) {
+ char buffer[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
+ int len;
+
+ if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING, buffer) != 1) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "CHALLENGE", c->name,
+ c->hostname);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ len = RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key);
- len = RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key);
+ /* Check if the length of the challenge is all right */
- /* Check if the length of the challenge is all right */
+ if(strlen(buffer) != len * 2) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name,
+ c->hostname, "wrong challenge length");
+ return false;
+ }
- if(strlen(buffer) != len*2)
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name, c->hostname, "wrong challenge length");
- return -1;
- }
+ /* Allocate buffers for the challenge */
- /* Allocate buffers for the challenge */
+ c->mychallenge = xrealloc(c->mychallenge, len);
- if(!c->mychallenge)
- c->mychallenge = xmalloc(len);
+ /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
- /* Convert the challenge from hexadecimal back to binary */
+ if(!hex2bin(buffer, c->mychallenge, len)) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s(%s): %s", "CHALLENGE", c->name, c->hostname, "invalid challenge");
+ return false;
+ }
- hex2bin(buffer,c->mychallenge,len);
+ c->allow_request = CHAL_REPLY;
- c->allow_request = CHAL_REPLY;
+ /* Rest is done by send_chal_reply() */
- /* Rest is done by send_chal_reply() */
-cp
- return send_chal_reply(c);
+ return send_chal_reply(c);
}
-int send_chal_reply(connection_t *c)
-{
- char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2+1];
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
-cp
- /* Calculate the hash from the challenge we received */
+bool send_chal_reply(connection_t *c) {
+ char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2 + 1];
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
- EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->indigest);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->mychallenge, RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key));
- EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, hash, NULL);
+ /* Calculate the hash from the challenge we received */
+
+ if(!EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->indigest)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->mychallenge, RSA_size(myself->connection->rsa_key))
+ || !EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, (unsigned char *)hash, NULL)) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during calculation of response for %s (%s): %s",
+ c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+ return false;
+ }
- /* Convert the hash to a hexadecimal formatted string */
+ /* Convert the hash to a hexadecimal formatted string */
- bin2hex(hash,hash,c->indigest->md_size);
- hash[c->indigest->md_size*2] = '\0';
+ bin2hex(hash, hash, c->indigest->md_size);
+ hash[c->indigest->md_size * 2] = '\0';
- /* Send the reply */
+ /* Send the reply */
-cp
- return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHAL_REPLY, hash);
+ return send_request(c, "%d %s", CHAL_REPLY, hash);
}
-int chal_reply_h(connection_t *c)
-{
- char hishash[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
- char myhash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
-cp
- if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d "MAX_STRING, hishash) != 1)
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "CHAL_REPLY", c->name, c->hostname);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Check if the length of the hash is all right */
-
- if(strlen(hishash) != c->outdigest->md_size*2)
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name, c->hostname, _("wrong challenge reply length"));
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Convert the hash to binary format */
-
- hex2bin(hishash, hishash, c->outdigest->md_size);
-
- /* Calculate the hash from the challenge we sent */
-
- EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->outdigest);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->hischallenge, RSA_size(c->rsa_key));
- EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, myhash, NULL);
-
- /* Verify the incoming hash with the calculated hash */
-
- if(memcmp(hishash, myhash, c->outdigest->md_size))
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Possible intruder %s (%s): %s"), c->name, c->hostname, _("wrong challenge reply"));
- if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_SCARY_THINGS)
- {
- bin2hex(myhash, hishash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- hishash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH*2] = '\0';
- syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Expected challenge reply: %s"), hishash);
- }
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Identity has now been positively verified.
- Send an acknowledgement with the rest of the information needed.
- */
-
- c->allow_request = ACK;
-cp
- return send_ack(c);
+bool chal_reply_h(connection_t *c) {
+ char hishash[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
+ char myhash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+
+ if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING, hishash) != 1) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "CHAL_REPLY", c->name,
+ c->hostname);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if the length of the hash is all right */
+
+ if(strlen(hishash) != c->outdigest->md_size * 2) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name,
+ c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply length");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /* Convert the hash to binary format */
+
+ if(!hex2bin(hishash, hishash, c->outdigest->md_size)) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s(%s): %s", "CHAL_REPLY", c->name, c->hostname, "invalid hash");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /* Calculate the hash from the challenge we sent */
+
+ if(!EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, c->outdigest)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, c->hischallenge, RSA_size(c->rsa_key))
+ || !EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, (unsigned char *)myhash, NULL)) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Error during calculation of response from %s (%s): %s",
+ c->name, c->hostname, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /* Verify the incoming hash with the calculated hash */
+
+ if(memcmp(hishash, myhash, c->outdigest->md_size)) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Possible intruder %s (%s): %s", c->name,
+ c->hostname, "wrong challenge reply");
+
+ ifdebug(SCARY_THINGS) {
+ bin2hex(myhash, hishash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ hishash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2] = '\0';
+ logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Expected challenge reply: %s", hishash);
+ }
+
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /* Identity has now been positively verified.
+ Send an acknowledgement with the rest of the information needed.
+ */
+
+ c->allow_request = ACK;
+
+ return send_ack(c);
}
-int send_ack(connection_t *c)
-{
- /* ACK message contains rest of the information the other end needs
- to create node_t and edge_t structures. */
-
- int x;
- char *address, *port;
- struct timeval now;
-cp
- /* Estimate weight */
-
- gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
- c->estimated_weight = (now.tv_sec - c->start.tv_sec) * 1000 + (now.tv_usec - c->start.tv_usec) / 1000;
- sockaddr2str(&c->address, &address, &port);
- x = send_request(c, "%d %s %s %d %lx", ACK, myport, address, c->estimated_weight, c->options);
- free(address);
- free(port);
-cp
- return x;
+bool send_ack(connection_t *c) {
+ /* ACK message contains rest of the information the other end needs
+ to create node_t and edge_t structures. */
+
+ struct timeval now;
+ bool choice;
+
+ /* Estimate weight */
+
+ gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
+ c->estimated_weight = (now.tv_sec - c->start.tv_sec) * 1000 + (now.tv_usec - c->start.tv_usec) / 1000;
+
+ /* Check some options */
+
+ if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "IndirectData"), &choice) && choice) || myself->options & OPTION_INDIRECT)
+ c->options |= OPTION_INDIRECT;
+
+ if((get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "TCPOnly"), &choice) && choice) || myself->options & OPTION_TCPONLY)
+ c->options |= OPTION_TCPONLY | OPTION_INDIRECT;
+
+ if(myself->options & OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY)
+ c->options |= OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY;
+
+ choice = myself->options & OPTION_CLAMP_MSS;
+ get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "ClampMSS"), &choice);
+ if(choice)
+ c->options |= OPTION_CLAMP_MSS;
+
+ get_config_int(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "Weight"), &c->estimated_weight);
+
+ return send_request(c, "%d %s %d %x", ACK, myport, c->estimated_weight, c->options);
}
-void send_everything(connection_t *c)
-{
- avl_node_t *node, *node2;
- node_t *n;
- subnet_t *s;
- edge_t *e;
-
- /* Send all known subnets */
-
- for(node = node_tree->head; node; node = node->next)
- {
- n = (node_t *)node->data;
-
- for(node2 = n->subnet_tree->head; node2; node2 = node2->next)
- {
- s = (subnet_t *)node2->data;
- send_add_subnet(c, s);
- }
- }
-
- /* Send all known edges */
-
- for(node = edge_tree->head; node; node = node->next)
- {
- e = (edge_t *)node->data;
-
- if(e == c->edge)
- continue;
-
- send_add_edge(c, e);
- }
+static void send_everything(connection_t *c) {
+ avl_node_t *node, *node2;
+ node_t *n;
+ subnet_t *s;
+ edge_t *e;
+
+ /* Send all known subnets and edges */
+
+ if(tunnelserver) {
+ for(node = myself->subnet_tree->head; node; node = node->next) {
+ s = node->data;
+ send_add_subnet(c, s);
+ }
+
+ return;
+ }
+
+ for(node = node_tree->head; node; node = node->next) {
+ n = node->data;
+
+ for(node2 = n->subnet_tree->head; node2; node2 = node2->next) {
+ s = node2->data;
+ send_add_subnet(c, s);
+ }
+
+ for(node2 = n->edge_tree->head; node2; node2 = node2->next) {
+ e = node2->data;
+ send_add_edge(c, e);
+ }
+ }
}
-int ack_h(connection_t *c)
-{
- char myaddress[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
- char hisport[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
- char *hisaddress, *dummy;
- int weight;
- long int options;
- node_t *n;
- connection_t *other;
- avl_node_t *node;
-cp
- if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d "MAX_STRING" "MAX_STRING" %d %lx", hisport, myaddress, &weight, &options) != 4)
- {
- syslog(LOG_ERR, _("Got bad %s from %s (%s)"), "ACK", c->name, c->hostname);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Check if we already have a node_t for him */
-
- n = lookup_node(c->name);
-
- if(!n)
- {
- n = new_node();
- n->name = xstrdup(c->name);
- node_add(n);
- }
- else
- {
- if(n->connection)
- {
- /* Oh dear, we already have a connection to this node. */
- if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_CONNECTIONS)
- syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("Established a second connection with %s (%s), closing old connection"), n->name, n->hostname);
- terminate_connection(n->connection, 0);
- }
-
- /* FIXME: check if information in existing node matches that of the other end of this connection */
- }
-
- n->connection = c;
- c->node = n;
- c->options |= options;
-
- /* Create an edge_t for this connection */
-
- c->edge = new_edge();
-cp
- c->edge->from.node = myself;
-// c->edge->from.tcpaddress = str2sockaddr(address, port);
- c->edge->from.udpaddress = str2sockaddr(myaddress, myport);
- c->edge->to.node = n;
-// c->edge->to.tcpaddress = c->address;
- sockaddr2str(&c->address, &hisaddress, &dummy);
- c->edge->to.udpaddress = str2sockaddr(hisaddress, hisport);
- free(hisaddress);
- free(dummy);
- c->edge->weight = (weight + c->estimated_weight) / 2;
- c->edge->connection = c;
- c->edge->options = c->options;
-cp
- edge_add(c->edge);
-
- /* Activate this connection */
-
- c->allow_request = ALL;
- c->status.active = 1;
-
- if(debug_lvl >= DEBUG_CONNECTIONS)
- syslog(LOG_NOTICE, _("Connection with %s (%s) activated"), c->name, c->hostname);
-
-cp
- /* Send him everything we know */
-
- send_everything(c);
-
- /* Notify others of this connection */
-
- for(node = connection_tree->head; node; node = node->next)
- {
- other = (connection_t *)node->data;
-
- if(other->status.active && other != c)
- send_add_edge(other, c->edge);
- }
-
- /* Run MST and SSSP algorithms */
-
- graph();
-
- /* Succesful connection, reset timeout if this is an outgoing connection. */
-
- if(c->outgoing)
- c->outgoing->timeout = 0;
-cp
- return 0;
+bool ack_h(connection_t *c) {
+ char hisport[MAX_STRING_SIZE];
+ char *hisaddress;
+ int weight, mtu;
+ uint32_t options;
+ node_t *n;
+ bool choice;
+
+ if(sscanf(c->buffer, "%*d " MAX_STRING " %d %x", hisport, &weight, &options) != 3) {
+ logger(LOG_ERR, "Got bad %s from %s (%s)", "ACK", c->name,
+ c->hostname);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if we already have a node_t for him */
+
+ n = lookup_node(c->name);
+
+ if(!n) {
+ n = new_node();
+ n->name = xstrdup(c->name);
+ node_add(n);
+ } else {
+ if(n->connection) {
+ /* Oh dear, we already have a connection to this node. */
+ ifdebug(CONNECTIONS) logger(LOG_DEBUG, "Established a second connection with %s (%s), closing old connection",
+ n->name, n->hostname);
+ terminate_connection(n->connection, false);
+ /* Run graph algorithm to purge key and make sure up/down scripts are rerun with new IP addresses and stuff */
+ graph();
+ }
+ }
+
+ n->connection = c;
+ c->node = n;
+ if(!(c->options & options & OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY)) {
+ c->options &= ~OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY;
+ options &= ~OPTION_PMTU_DISCOVERY;
+ }
+ c->options |= options;
+
+ if(get_config_int(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "PMTU"), &mtu) && mtu < n->mtu)
+ n->mtu = mtu;
+
+ if(get_config_int(lookup_config(config_tree, "PMTU"), &mtu) && mtu < n->mtu)
+ n->mtu = mtu;
+
+ if(get_config_bool(lookup_config(c->config_tree, "ClampMSS"), &choice)) {
+ if(choice)
+ c->options |= OPTION_CLAMP_MSS;
+ else
+ c->options &= ~OPTION_CLAMP_MSS;
+ }
+
+ /* Activate this connection */
+
+ c->allow_request = ALL;
+ c->status.active = true;
+
+ ifdebug(CONNECTIONS) logger(LOG_NOTICE, "Connection with %s (%s) activated", c->name,
+ c->hostname);
+
+ /* Send him everything we know */
+
+ send_everything(c);
+
+ /* Create an edge_t for this connection */
+
+ c->edge = new_edge();
+ c->edge->from = myself;
+ c->edge->to = n;
+ sockaddr2str(&c->address, &hisaddress, NULL);
+ c->edge->address = str2sockaddr(hisaddress, hisport);
+ free(hisaddress);
+ c->edge->weight = (weight + c->estimated_weight) / 2;
+ c->edge->connection = c;
+ c->edge->options = c->options;
+
+ edge_add(c->edge);
+
+ /* Notify everyone of the new edge */
+
+ if(tunnelserver)
+ send_add_edge(c, c->edge);
+ else
+ send_add_edge(everyone, c->edge);
+
+ /* Run MST and SSSP algorithms */
+
+ graph();
+
+ return true;
}
projects / tinc / blobdiff