#include "prf.h"
#include "sptps.h"
-char *logfilename;
-#include "utils.c"
-
/*
Nonce MUST be exchanged first (done)
Signatures MUST be done over both nonces, to guarantee the signature is fresh
return false;
}
+// Send a record (datagram version, accepts all record types, handles encryption and authentication).
+static bool send_record_priv_datagram(sptps_t *s, uint8_t type, const char *data, uint16_t len) {
+ char buffer[len + 23UL];
+
+ // Create header with sequence number, length and record type
+ uint32_t seqno = htonl(s->outseqno++);
+ uint16_t netlen = htons(len);
+
+ memcpy(buffer, &netlen, 2);
+ memcpy(buffer + 2, &seqno, 4);
+ buffer[6] = type;
+
+ // Add plaintext (TODO: avoid unnecessary copy)
+ memcpy(buffer + 7, data, len);
+
+ if(s->outstate) {
+ // If first handshake has finished, encrypt and HMAC
+ cipher_set_counter(&s->outcipher, &seqno, sizeof seqno);
+ if(!cipher_counter_xor(&s->outcipher, buffer + 6, len + 1UL, buffer + 6))
+ return false;
+
+ if(!digest_create(&s->outdigest, buffer, len + 7UL, buffer + 7UL + len))
+ return false;
+
+ return s->send_data(s->handle, buffer + 2, len + 21UL);
+ } else {
+ // Otherwise send as plaintext
+ return s->send_data(s->handle, buffer + 2, len + 5UL);
+ }
+}
// Send a record (private version, accepts all record types, handles encryption and authentication).
static bool send_record_priv(sptps_t *s, uint8_t type, const char *data, uint16_t len) {
- char plaintext[len + 23];
- char ciphertext[len + 19];
+ if(s->datagram)
+ return send_record_priv_datagram(s, type, data, len);
+
+ char buffer[len + 23UL];
// Create header with sequence number, length and record type
uint32_t seqno = htonl(s->outseqno++);
uint16_t netlen = htons(len);
- memcpy(plaintext, &seqno, 4);
- memcpy(plaintext + 4, &netlen, 2);
- plaintext[6] = type;
+ memcpy(buffer, &seqno, 4);
+ memcpy(buffer + 4, &netlen, 2);
+ buffer[6] = type;
// Add plaintext (TODO: avoid unnecessary copy)
- memcpy(plaintext + 7, data, len);
+ memcpy(buffer + 7, data, len);
if(s->outstate) {
// If first handshake has finished, encrypt and HMAC
- if(!digest_create(&s->outdigest, plaintext, len + 7, plaintext + 7 + len))
+ if(!cipher_counter_xor(&s->outcipher, buffer + 4, len + 3UL, buffer + 4))
return false;
- if(!cipher_counter_xor(&s->outcipher, plaintext + 4, sizeof ciphertext, ciphertext))
+ if(!digest_create(&s->outdigest, buffer, len + 7UL, buffer + 7UL + len))
return false;
- return s->send_data(s->handle, ciphertext, len + 19);
+ return s->send_data(s->handle, buffer + 4, len + 19UL);
} else {
// Otherwise send as plaintext
- return s->send_data(s->handle, plaintext + 4, len + 3);
+ return s->send_data(s->handle, buffer + 4, len + 3UL);
}
}
// Send an application record.
-bool send_record(sptps_t *s, uint8_t type, const char *data, uint16_t len) {
+bool sptps_send_record(sptps_t *s, uint8_t type, const char *data, uint16_t len) {
// Sanity checks: application cannot send data before handshake is finished,
// and only record types 0..127 are allowed.
if(!s->outstate)
size_t keylen = ECDH_SIZE;
// Make room for our KEX message, which we will keep around since send_sig() needs it.
+ if(s->mykex)
+ abort();
s->mykex = realloc(s->mykex, 1 + 32 + keylen);
if(!s->mykex)
return error(s, errno, strerror(errno));
size_t keylen = ECDH_SIZE;
size_t siglen = ecdsa_size(&s->mykey);
- // Concatenate both KEX messages, plus tag indicating if it is from the connection originator
- char msg[(1 + 32 + keylen) * 2 + 1];
+ // Concatenate both KEX messages, plus tag indicating if it is from the connection originator, plus label
+ char msg[(1 + 32 + keylen) * 2 + 1 + s->labellen];
char sig[siglen];
msg[0] = s->initiator;
memcpy(msg + 1, s->mykex, 1 + 32 + keylen);
- memcpy(msg + 2 + 32 + keylen, s->hiskex, 1 + 32 + keylen);
+ memcpy(msg + 1 + 33 + keylen, s->hiskex, 1 + 32 + keylen);
+ memcpy(msg + 1 + 2 * (33 + keylen), s->label, s->labellen);
// Sign the result.
if(!ecdsa_sign(&s->mykey, msg, sizeof msg, sig))
// Ignore version number for now.
// Make a copy of the KEX message, send_sig() and receive_sig() need it
+ if(s->hiskex)
+ abort();
s->hiskex = realloc(s->hiskex, len);
if(!s->hiskex)
return error(s, errno, strerror(errno));
return error(s, EIO, "Invalid KEX record length");
// Concatenate both KEX messages, plus tag indicating if it is from the connection originator
- char msg[(1 + 32 + keylen) * 2 + 1];
+ char msg[(1 + 32 + keylen) * 2 + 1 + s->labellen];
msg[0] = !s->initiator;
memcpy(msg + 1, s->hiskex, 1 + 32 + keylen);
- memcpy(msg + 2 + 32 + keylen, s->mykex, 1 + 32 + keylen);
+ memcpy(msg + 1 + 33 + keylen, s->mykex, 1 + 32 + keylen);
+ memcpy(msg + 1 + 2 * (33 + keylen), s->label, s->labellen);
// Verify signature.
if(!ecdsa_verify(&s->hiskey, msg, sizeof msg, data))
s->hiskex = NULL;
// Send cipher change record
- if(!send_ack(s))
+ if(s->outstate && !send_ack(s))
return false;
// TODO: only set new keys after ACK has been set/received
return false;
}
- s->outstate = true;
-
return true;
}
// Force another Key EXchange (for testing purposes).
-bool force_kex(sptps_t *s) {
+bool sptps_force_kex(sptps_t *s) {
if(!s->outstate || s->state != SPTPS_SECONDARY_KEX)
return error(s, EINVAL, "Cannot force KEX in current state");
// If we already sent our secondary public ECDH key, we expect the peer to send his.
if(!receive_sig(s, data, len))
return false;
- // s->state = SPTPS_ACK;
- s->state = SPTPS_ACK;
+ if(s->outstate)
+ s->state = SPTPS_ACK;
+ else {
+ s->outstate = true;
+ if(!receive_ack(s, NULL, 0))
+ return false;
+ s->receive_record(s->handle, SPTPS_HANDSHAKE, NULL, 0);
+ s->state = SPTPS_SECONDARY_KEX;
+ }
+
return true;
case SPTPS_ACK:
// We expect a handshake message to indicate transition to the new keys.
if(!receive_ack(s, data, len))
return false;
+ s->receive_record(s->handle, SPTPS_HANDSHAKE, NULL, 0);
s->state = SPTPS_SECONDARY_KEX;
return true;
// TODO: split ACK into a VERify and ACK?
}
}
+// Receive incoming data, datagram version.
+static bool sptps_receive_data_datagram(sptps_t *s, const char *data, size_t len) {
+ if(len < (s->instate ? 21 : 5))
+ return error(s, EIO, "Received short packet");
+
+ uint32_t seqno;
+ memcpy(&seqno, data, 4);
+ seqno = ntohl(seqno);
+
+ if(!s->instate) {
+ if(seqno != s->inseqno) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Received invalid packet seqno: %d != %d\n", seqno, s->inseqno);
+ return error(s, EIO, "Invalid packet seqno");
+ }
+
+ s->inseqno = seqno + 1;
+
+ uint8_t type = data[4];
+
+ if(type != SPTPS_HANDSHAKE)
+ return error(s, EIO, "Application record received before handshake finished");
+
+ return receive_handshake(s, data + 5, len - 5);
+ }
+
+ if(seqno < s->inseqno) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Received late or replayed packet: %d < %d\n", seqno, s->inseqno);
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ if(seqno > s->inseqno)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Missed %d packets\n", seqno - s->inseqno);
+
+ s->inseqno = seqno + 1;
+
+ uint16_t netlen = htons(len - 21);
+
+ char buffer[len + 23];
+
+ memcpy(buffer, &netlen, 2);
+ memcpy(buffer + 2, data, len);
+
+ memcpy(&seqno, buffer + 2, 4);
+
+ // Check HMAC and decrypt.
+ if(!digest_verify(&s->indigest, buffer, len - 14, buffer + len - 14))
+ return error(s, EIO, "Invalid HMAC");
+
+ cipher_set_counter(&s->incipher, &seqno, sizeof seqno);
+ if(!cipher_counter_xor(&s->incipher, buffer + 6, len - 4, buffer + 6))
+ return false;
+
+ // Append a NULL byte for safety.
+ buffer[len - 14] = 0;
+
+ uint8_t type = buffer[6];
+
+ if(type < SPTPS_HANDSHAKE) {
+ if(!s->instate)
+ return error(s, EIO, "Application record received before handshake finished");
+ if(!s->receive_record(s->handle, type, buffer + 7, len - 21))
+ return false;
+ } else {
+ return error(s, EIO, "Invalid record type");
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
// Receive incoming data. Check if it contains a complete record, if so, handle it.
-bool receive_data(sptps_t *s, const char *data, size_t len) {
+bool sptps_receive_data(sptps_t *s, const char *data, size_t len) {
+ if(s->datagram)
+ return sptps_receive_data_datagram(s, data, len);
+
while(len) {
// First read the 2 length bytes.
if(s->buflen < 6) {
if(toread > len)
toread = len;
- if(s->instate) {
- if(!cipher_counter_xor(&s->incipher, data, toread, s->inbuf + s->buflen))
- return false;
- } else {
- memcpy(s->inbuf + s->buflen, data, toread);
- }
+ memcpy(s->inbuf + s->buflen, data, toread);
s->buflen += toread;
len -= toread;
data += toread;
-
+
// Exit early if we don't have the full length.
if(s->buflen < 6)
return true;
+ // Decrypt the length bytes
+
+ if(s->instate) {
+ if(!cipher_counter_xor(&s->incipher, s->inbuf + 4, 2, &s->reclen))
+ return false;
+ } else {
+ memcpy(&s->reclen, s->inbuf + 4, 2);
+ }
+
+ s->reclen = ntohs(s->reclen);
+
// If we have the length bytes, ensure our buffer can hold the whole request.
- uint16_t reclen;
- memcpy(&reclen, s->inbuf + 4, 2);
- reclen = htons(reclen);
- s->inbuf = realloc(s->inbuf, reclen + 23UL);
+ s->inbuf = realloc(s->inbuf, s->reclen + 23UL);
if(!s->inbuf)
return error(s, errno, strerror(errno));
}
// Read up to the end of the record.
- uint16_t reclen;
- memcpy(&reclen, s->inbuf + 4, 2);
- reclen = htons(reclen);
- size_t toread = reclen + (s->instate ? 23UL : 7UL) - s->buflen;
+ size_t toread = s->reclen + (s->instate ? 23UL : 7UL) - s->buflen;
if(toread > len)
toread = len;
- if(s->instate) {
- if(!cipher_counter_xor(&s->incipher, data, toread, s->inbuf + s->buflen))
- return false;
- } else {
- memcpy(s->inbuf + s->buflen, data, toread);
- }
-
+ memcpy(s->inbuf + s->buflen, data, toread);
s->buflen += toread;
len -= toread;
data += toread;
// If we don't have a whole record, exit.
- if(s->buflen < reclen + (s->instate ? 23UL : 7UL))
+ if(s->buflen < s->reclen + (s->instate ? 23UL : 7UL))
return true;
- // Check HMAC.
- if(s->instate)
- if(!digest_verify(&s->indigest, s->inbuf, reclen + 7UL, s->inbuf + reclen + 7UL))
- error(s, EIO, "Invalid HMAC");
+ // Check HMAC and decrypt.
+ if(s->instate) {
+ if(!digest_verify(&s->indigest, s->inbuf, s->reclen + 7UL, s->inbuf + s->reclen + 7UL))
+ return error(s, EIO, "Invalid HMAC");
+
+ if(!cipher_counter_xor(&s->incipher, s->inbuf + 6UL, s->reclen + 1UL, s->inbuf + 6UL))
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // Append a NULL byte for safety.
+ s->inbuf[s->reclen + 7UL] = 0;
uint8_t type = s->inbuf[6];
- // Handle record.
if(type < SPTPS_HANDSHAKE) {
if(!s->instate)
return error(s, EIO, "Application record received before handshake finished");
- if(!s->receive_record(s->handle, type, s->inbuf + 7, reclen))
+ if(!s->receive_record(s->handle, type, s->inbuf + 7, s->reclen))
return false;
} else if(type == SPTPS_HANDSHAKE) {
- if(!receive_handshake(s, s->inbuf + 7, reclen))
+ if(!receive_handshake(s, s->inbuf + 7, s->reclen))
return false;
} else {
return error(s, EIO, "Invalid record type");
}
// Start a SPTPS session.
-bool start_sptps(sptps_t *s, void *handle, bool initiator, ecdsa_t mykey, ecdsa_t hiskey, const char *label, size_t labellen, send_data_t send_data, receive_record_t receive_record) {
+bool sptps_start(sptps_t *s, void *handle, bool initiator, bool datagram, ecdsa_t mykey, ecdsa_t hiskey, const char *label, size_t labellen, send_data_t send_data, receive_record_t receive_record) {
// Initialise struct sptps
memset(s, 0, sizeof *s);
s->handle = handle;
s->initiator = initiator;
+ s->datagram = datagram;
s->mykey = mykey;
s->hiskey = hiskey;
if(!s->label)
return error(s, errno, strerror(errno));
- s->inbuf = malloc(7);
- if(!s->inbuf)
- return error(s, errno, strerror(errno));
- s->buflen = 4;
- memset(s->inbuf, 0, 4);
+ if(!datagram) {
+ s->inbuf = malloc(7);
+ if(!s->inbuf)
+ return error(s, errno, strerror(errno));
+ s->buflen = 4;
+ memset(s->inbuf, 0, 4);
+ }
memcpy(s->label, label, labellen);
s->labellen = labellen;
}
// Stop a SPTPS session.
-bool stop_sptps(sptps_t *s) {
+bool sptps_stop(sptps_t *s) {
// Clean up any resources.
ecdh_free(&s->ecdh);
free(s->inbuf);
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